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I

EFFICIENCY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY VERSUS AUSTERITY
This article is a revisited and expanded version of a previous
study written in 2014 as a national report for the XV IAPL World
Congress of Procedural Law: Effective Judicial Relief and
Remedies in an Age of Austerity held on May 26-29, 2015, in
Istanbul, Turkey.3 Much has changed in Brazil in the five years since
this study was first published: there is a new Code of Civil Procedure
(C.P.C./2015), a new political orientation in the Presidency, and,
more specifically, a new economic orientation in the Ministry of
Economy.
This new political trend is reflected in the new justice system in
Brazil. Brazil is going through a phase of political instability and
possibly constitutional crisis. The Executive and the Judiciary are
not aligned. For example, the Brazilian Supreme Court has been
controlling the acts of the President during the COVID-19
pandemic.4 The issues discussed in this article are related to the
institutional development. We will mention the political situation
merely in passing. The Judiciary maintains its independence from
the other branches of government and has acted in a restrained way

See Antonio Gidi & Hermes Zaneti, Jr., Brazilian Civil Procedure in the ‘Age
of Austerity’? Effectiveness, Speed, and Legal Certainty: Small Claims,
Uncontested Claims, and Simplification of Judicial Decisions and Proceedings,
8 ERASMUS L. REV. 244 (2015).
4
Fredie Didier Jr., et al., Brazilian Precedents in Covid-19: Supreme Court
Matters, BART KRANS & ANNA NYLUND (EDS.), COURTS COPING WITH COVID19 (forthcoming 2021) (discussing several Supreme Court decisions allocating
power between the states and the federal executive).
3
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to defend the Constitution and the laws. Despite the stress in the
institutions, democracy continues to prevail in Brazil.
These changes translate into a political agenda that is less
concerned with broad access to social rights, and more focused on
fiscal austerity and economic liberty. Among the many legislative
changes that could impact this research, we must cite the social
security reform (aimed at reducing the economic impact of the
retirement of private and public workers)5 and the employment law
reform (aimed at reducing the social rights of workers and
increasing job creation).6 Additionally, several law reforms affected
the public administration and the administration of justice.7 Most
notably, amendments to the Introductory Act to Brazilian Law
(introducing considerations regarding the concrete impact of
administrative and judicial decisions on the economy)8 and the
enactment of the Economic Freedom Act (creating rights of
economic freedom, protection of the free initiative, and free exercise
of economic activity, with the objective of stimulating investment
and generating legal certainty through the de-bureaucratization of
the public administration).9
These winds of change dramatically shifted the landscape that
led to our first study on this matter—a time when the justice system
was seen as a “non-cost,” and the only concerns were legal certainty,
the effectiveness of judgments, and the reduction of the caseload. 10
The model criticized in our original study resulted in a “free justice,”

5

See GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL, http://www.brasil.gov.br/novaprevidencia/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2020).
6
See Lei No. 13.467, de 13 de Julho de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 14.7.2017 (Braz.).
7
See, e.g., Lei No. 13.655, de 25 de Abril de 2018, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 26.4.2018 (Braz.) (adding new provisions to Lei de Introdução às
Normas do Direito Brasileiro); see also Lei No. 13.874, de 20 de Setembro de
2019, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 20.9.2019 (Braz.); see also Lei
No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto de 2018, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
14.8.2018 (Braz.).
8
See Lei No. 13.655, de 25 de Abril de 2018, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 26.4.2018 (Braz.).
9
See Lei No. 13.874, de 20 de Setembro de 2019, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 20.9.2019 (Braz.).
10
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246.
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which led to the tragedy of the commons of the Brazilian justice
system, with more than 78.7 million lawsuits pending in 2018.11
As this paper will demonstrate, Brazil now enters the age of
austerity in civil procedure for two reasons: first, the economic
situation in the country including the internal debt crises, and
second, the infancy of the process of democratization and increased
access to justice, which began in 1988 with the establishment of
democracy and the enactment of the Constitution. In this generation,
Brazil has considerably advanced access to justice by giving dignity
to and recognizing the fundamental rights of thousands of Brazilians
who were previously excluded from society, most notably those
without education or financial resources to use the Judiciary in the
protection of their rights. This breadth of access to the judiciary led
to demobilization of the government in guaranteeing direct access
to other public bodies and oversight of the regulatory agencies of the
financial system, telephone services, and aviation.12 Curiously, the
11

The updated 2019 Justiça em Números Report contains the main data from the
Brazilian justice system in 2018, with detailed information about the
performance of the Judiciary, specifically, its expenses, structure, and number of
pending cases. See infra note 80. The Report has been published since 2004 and
has consistently improved its methodology. Every unit of the system of justice
(state and federal) collaborate sending data. The numbers show, for the first
time, a reduction in the number of legal proceedings: excluding enforcement
proceedings, the number of cases was reduced by 1.2 million cases, which
represents a 3.3% reduction. This reduction happened in the past two years,
while from 2009 to 2016 the cases rose an average of 4% each year. The
numbers in 2018 are the result of a 1.9% reduction in the number of cases filed,
combined with a productivity increase of 3.8%. In 2018, 28.1 million legal
proceedings were filed, and 31.9 million were adjudicated. This represents a net
result of 13.7% more cases concluded than new cases filed. This was the first
time in a decade that all areas of the Judiciary were able to adjudicate more
cases than were filed. All 24 Circuits of the Employment Courts achieved the
same feat. The expenses of the Judiciary in Brazil in 2018 was 93.7 Billion
Reals (roughly equivalent to $30 billion USD), an increase of 0.4% from 2017.
As this paper was concluded, a new Report was published in 2020 with the
information related to 2019. This article will mostly use the 2019 Report, with
data of 2018. See Justiça em Números, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA 1
(2018) https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/8d9faee7812d35a58cee3d92d2df2f25.pdf.
12
See, e.g., Joaquim Falcão, Regulatory Agencies and the Judiciary , CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/agias-reguladoras-e-o-poderjudicio/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (considering the impacts of the regulation in
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most common litigants, both as plaintiffs or defendants, are public
bodies.13 The lack of direct support to the population and market
control in turn, generates more pressure for access to justice through
the Judiciary. The Judiciary, therefore, was a promoter of the redemocratization, but this change meant an increase in the cost of the
administration of justice, which presented an obstacle to
effectuating justice.
Moreover, the Judiciary does not raise enough money. A recent
study on judicial fees confirmed that the Judiciary operates at a
deficit, that there is a huge imbalance between states regarding
judicial fees, and that the fee structure encourages appeals. 14 This
information leads to the need to review the fee structure as well as
the constitutional guarantee of free access to justice, which to this
day, is conditioned solely on the self-declaration of financial need.
Another difficulty in addressing the shift to austerity is the
ambiguity of the expression “austerity,” which may have different
meanings in different situations. For example, the expression is
generally employed by economists for rigor in the control of public
expenses by measures of control based on a sustainable level of the
public deficit (“austerity-control”). In this sense, the fiscal reforms
of the 2000s imposed rigid limits on expenses for the Judiciary and
Prosecutors by linking them to the amount of taxes collected (Law
101/2001, known as ‘Fiscal Responsibility Law’).15 However, this
limitation was enacted before the current age of austerity and was
not specifically directed towards the expenses of the judicial system,
but rather the expenses of all public organizations. Regardless, the

the judicialization of the consumer claims and asking “do agencies have any
responsibility or contribution in the face of increasing judicialization?”).
13
See 100 Maiores Litigantes, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2012),
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/100_maiores_litigantes.pdf
(other major litigants are banks, insurance, and credit card companies).
14
See DEPARTAMENTO DE PESQUISAS JUDICIARIAS, DIAGNÓSTICO DAS CUSTAS
PROCESSUAIS PRATICADAS NOS TRIBUNAIS (2019) (Braz.) (available at:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/relatorio_custas_processuais2019.pdf).
15
Lei Complementar No. 101, de 4 de Maio de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 5.5.2000 (Braz.).
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Brazilian Judiciary is one of the most expensive in the world,
accounting for roughly 2% of the Brazilian GDP.16
Despite the economic potential and territorial dimensions of the
country, Brazilian people have always been dependent upon the
Public Administration. Additionally, because a major part of the
population is not independent from the State, we experience the
situation of “austerity-necessity.” A deficient public service,
connected to broad access to justice, is one of the aspects discussed
in this paper.
This paper discusses judicial proceedings for the resolution of
small claims, uncontested claims, and simple matters, from the
perspective of the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure.
The current relevant legislation in Brazil is, for the most part, the
direct product of the 1988 Constitution (CF/88) and law reform
pursuant to a political pact among the leaders of all three branches
of government (“Republican Pact”). Signed in 2004, the Executive,
Legislative, and Judiciary branches joined forces to promote a
speedy and efficient justice system in Brazil.17 This pact led to the
approval of Constitutional Amendment number 45 in 2004 (EC
45/2004), which promoted a major reform of the Brazilian
Judiciary.18 This initiative gave constitutional standing to the
procedural objectives of efficiency (protection of fundamental
rights, access to justice, and speedy trial) and legal certainty
(stability of decisions and avoidance of contradictory decisions).19
The 2004 Constitutional Amendment brought about several
important innovations. One was the fundamental right to judicial
protection at a reasonable time (Article 5, LXXVIII, CF/88).)
Another important innovation was the “súmula vinculante” (Article
16

Luan Sperandio, Why Is the Brazilian Judiciary So Expensive and Slow?,
GAZETA DO POVO, https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/wiseup-news/why-is-thebrazilian-judiciary-so-expensive-and-slow/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
17
See Pacto Republicano de Estado por um Sistema de Justiça Mais Acessível
Ágil e Efetivo, de 13 de abril de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
26.5.2009 (Braz.).
18
See Emenda Constitucional No. 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2004 (Braz.).
19
See Carlos Alberto Alvaro de Oliveira, Fundamental Rights to Effectiveness
and Security in a Dynamic Perspective, 1 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 57 (2008)
(discussing the compatibility between these fundamental rights and their
importance for current civil procedure).
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103-A, CF/88), a precedent-like statement enacted by the Brazilian
Supreme Court (mostly a Constitutional Court) that binds the
Judiciary and Public Administration.20 A third innovation was the
prerequisite that all constitutional cases to be decided by the
Brazilian Supreme Court have “general repercussion” (a kind of writ
of certiorari to give the court control of its own docket) (Article
102(3), CF/88). The Constitutional Amendment, therefore, created
a new paradigm of efficiency and a new methodology for the higher
courts in the Judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court.21
After the system of precedents was established in Brazil, the
Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 broadened and formalized the
horizontal and vertical binding precedents. Trial judges and courts
must follow their own precedents as well as the precedents of courts
above them.22
This article will address the reduced involvement of courts in
family law, wills, and other areas of de-judicialization. It will also
discuss special proceedings and procedural techniques, such as
small-claims courts, monitory action, and in limine judgments, as
illustrations of recent legal reforms regarding cases involving simple
matters, the simplification of judicial decisions, and uncontested
claims. It will also discuss changes brought up by the Code of Civil
Procedure of 2015, including the importance of binding precedents
and techniques for the aggregation of cases as a strategy for reducing
repetitive cases and for increasing legal certainty.
All these innovations stem not from austerity, but from the
fixation of Brazilian civil procedure with the ideals of efficiency,
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A (Braz.) (“The
Federal Supreme Court may (…) issue a summula (restatement of case law)
which, as from publication in the official press, shall have a binding effect upon
the lower bodies of the Judicial Power and the direct and indirect public
administration, in the federal, state, and local levels, and which may also be
reviewed or revoked, as set forth in law.”).
21
See Emenda Constitucional No. 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2004 (Braz.).
22
See generally, HERMES ZANETI JR., THE BINDING VALUE OF PRECENDENTS
(Juspodivm ed., 4th ed. 2019); MICHELE TARUFFO, IL VERTICE AMBIGUO,
SAGGI SULLA CASSAZIONE CIVILE (1991); LUIZ GUILHERME MARINONI,
PRECEDENTES OBRIGATÓRIOS (Revista Dos Tribunais ed., 3rd ed. 2014);
DANIEL MITIDIERO, CORTES SUPERIORES E CORTES SUPREMAS, DO CONTROLE À
INTERPRETAÇÃO, DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA AO PRECEDENTE, XIII REDP. 934 (2013).
20
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legal certainty, and access to justice. The debate about austerity,
which was previously nonexistent in Brazil, has begun. By
expanding access to justice to a broader portion of society, the legal
system increased both the number of cases and the costs associated
with the judicial system. However, the excess litigation and
expenses associated with the expansion of access to justice have
contradictorily curtailed access to justice. This current situation
requires new efforts to increase efficiency and legal certainty, while
still maximizing access to justice.
II

AUSTERITY AND REDUCTION OF COSTS VERSUS
EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGAL CERTAINTY
Because austerity and the reduction of costs in the Brazilian
justice system are not popular values, there was until recently, no
open dialogue about them. Except for the above-mentioned Fiscal
Responsibility Law in the 2000s,23 the subject of austerity in the
Judiciary was practically non-existent in Brazil. When the original
article was written in 2014, austerity may have been considered
behind closed doors, but neither legal doctrine nor the annals of
Congress make direct reference to it. It was clear that there was only
a concern for efficiency and legal certainty, with total indifference
to the problem of the costs of justice.24 As stated in the introduction,
this approach has drastically changed.
We must first discuss the general approach to reforming the
administration of justice. Then, we will discuss the winds of change
which landed within Brazil over the past five years.
In recent years, most legal reforms of the Brazilian model of
justice focused entirely on efficiency and legal certainty.25
Efficiency means access to justice for the poor, judicial protection
of individual and collective fundamental rights, and speedy
proceedings.26 Legal certainty includes confidence in and the
stability of judicial opinions, avoidance of contradictory decisions,

23

See Lei Complementar N. 101, de 4 de Maio de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.5.2000 (Braz.).
24
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246.
25
See, e.g., the aggregate litigation and the binding precedents discussed below.
26
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246.
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and the indirect reduction of the burden on the Judiciary through the
use of new techniques for the resolution of repetitive cases.27
The movement towards efficiency and legal certainty are not
antithetical, but complementary. The more people have access to
justice, the higher the burden on the Judiciary, and the less efficient
it becomes— therefore, the higher the burden on the Judiciary, the
greater the need for efficiency. Legal certainty (for the reduction of
contradictory opinions) and uniformity of decisions (to reduce the
number of judicial proceedings) help people make decisions on
whether to file or contest lawsuits. They allow habitual litigants to
adopt responsible strategies to avoid litigation, which is particularly
important in a situation where repetitive cases are emanating from
both the public sector and some sectors of the private market.
The access to justice movement, therefore, mandates law reform
to increase stability and legal certainty. As we will see below, this
relationship of cause and effect is clear in Brazil; as the legislature’s
attention in encouraging access to justice has intensified, so has the
need to deal with the overburdening on the Judiciary. This
overburdening has worsened a “crisis” in the Brazilian Judiciary.
Efficiency and legal certainty are the overall principles proposed as
the solution for the “crisis” of the Judiciary. It is not clear, however,
whether this scheme is sufficient or will lead to the expected results.
Recent initiatives, directed at attaining both efficiency and legal
certainty, have been pursued in small claims courts (because of the
reduced value of the claim and lesser complexity of the subject
matter) and simple and uncontested matters (cases without
objection, or in which the legal conflict had already been previously
decided by test cases or precedent).28
To promote effective access to justice, Brazil created
institutions specializing in the protection of collective and individual
fundamental rights, broadening the functions of the Public
Prosecutors (Ministerio Publico), and creating the Public Defenders
(Defensoria Publica), an institution of public advocacy with integral

27

Id. at 245.
See, e.g., consumidor.gov (in connection with an ODR mechanisms connected
with the small claims courts); see also Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 332, de 16 de Março
de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
28
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and free legal support for the poor in both criminal and civil
matters.29
On the other hand, recent initiatives have tried to minimize the
negative impact brought by the increased access to justice. These
initiatives have ranged from the adoption of biding precedents and
aggregate litigation to the growing use of ADR.
One strategy is to mandate a potential plaintiff to seek an
amicable solution directly from the public body that caused the
harm. Some court decisions have limited the broad access to justice.
The Supreme Court made it mandatory for the plaintiff to
administratively request a social security benefit before being
allowed to file a lawsuit.30 The plaintiff, however, only needs to
make a request; it is not necessary to exhaust the administrative
procedure.31
Another strategy to reinforce the multidoor judicial system is
encouraging settlement. CPC/2015 established a mandatory
procedural hearing in ordinary proceedings with the sole objective
of conciliation and mediation.32 The party who does not appear will
be fined (CPC/2015, art. 334).33 As technology has progressed
judicial opinions have required consumers to go through online
dispute resolution (ODR).34 ODR is conducted through the Ministry
of Justice’s site consumidor.gov.35 This experience, in turn, led the
National Council of Justice (CNJ)36 to study an agreement between
the site and the small claims courts to legally mandate ODR
proceedings before a legal proceeding could be filed.37 A pilot
29

Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246.
Id. at 248.
31
Id.
32
See Lei No 13.105, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
33
Id.
34
CONSUMER.GOV, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.consumer.gov (last
visited Oct. 27, 2020).
35
Id.
36
See Gidi & Zaneti, Jr. supra note 3, at 248-49 (explaining the role of the
National Council of Justice (CNJ)).
37
CNJ recognizes that there is no impropriety in TJMA Resolution 43/2017,
TJMA SOCIAL COMMUNICATION,
https://www.tjma.jus.br/midia/tj/noticia/500837 (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) (Due
to the success of the platform, the Supreme Court of the state of Maranhão
decided that only after attempting to mediate through the platform one is able to
30
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project in the First Circuit of the Federal Courts (including the
Federal District and the states of Minas Gerais, Acre, Amapa,
Amazonas, Bahia, Goias, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Pará, Piaui,
Rondonia, Roraima, and Tocantins) is already underway.38
In both cases, judicial judgments have been reduced without
curtailing access to justice.39
Several initiatives have begun for the revision of the system of
judicial fees and gratuitous judicial services.40 Until recently, Brazil
was not concerned with the value of judicial fees. A detailed study
commissioned by the National Council of Justice (“CNJ”) detected
an imbalance between the fees in each of the 26 states of Brazil and
the federal judiciary.41 The CNJ used this study to prepare
legislative proposals.42
Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of free access to justice
for people without financial means is being reevaluated.43 Another
study on the subject of gratuitous justice was commissioned by the
Federal Courts’ National Intelligence Center and prepared by
federal judges, Taís Schilling Ferraz and Vânila Cardoso Moraes.44

have requests subjected to analysis by the court. The National Council of Justice
understood that this procedure does not offend the guarantees of the parties. CNJ
recognizes that there is no impropriety in TJMA Resolution 43/2017.).
38
See Jeferson Melo, Projeto Piloto Marca Integraçao Entre Pje e
Consumidor.gov.br, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.cnj.jus.br/projeto-piloto-marca-integracao-entre-pje-e-consumidorgov-br/.
39
Id.
40
See Manuel Carlos Montenegro, CNJ Submits to Congress a Bill to Regulate
Court Costs, CNJ NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 14, 2020) https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnjentrega-ao-congresso-proposta-de-lei-para-disciplinar-custas-judiciais/.
41
See Departamento de Pesquisas Judiciarias, Diagnóstico Das Custas
Processuais Practicadas Nos Tribunais (2019),
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/relatorio_custas_processuais
2019.pdf (Braz.).
42
Montenegro, supra note 40.
43
See Taís Schilling Ferraz & Vânila Cardoso Moraes, Nota Técnica N.
22/2019, CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGÊNCIA DA JUSTIÇA FEDERAL (May 31,
2019), https://www.cjf.jus.br/cjf/corregedoria-da-justica-federal/centro-deestudos-judiciarios-1/nucleo-de-estudo-e-pesquisa/notas-tecnicas/nota-tecnica22-2019-2013-gratuidade-judiciaria/@@download/arquivo.
44
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE, https://www.cnj.jus.br/sobre-o-cnj/quemsomos/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2021) (The National Council of Justice (Centro
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As an example of how the courts are shifting their view of gratuitous
justice, the study suggests that any such provision must be premised
on a study of its impact on the budget and in the litigiousness in each
state and court.45 There is clear awareness now that judicial fees
serve not only to balance the judicial budget but also to deter
litigation. Another bill currently being debated in the Senate seeks
to limit gratuitous judicial fees in Federal Small Claims Courts to
people without financial means.46 In the same vein, the Federal
Government is considering limiting gratuitous litigation against
Social Security only to people without financial means.47
The new Code of Civil Procedure aimed to address the issues of
slow, excessive, and frivolous litigation, as well as to reduce the
number of appeals. For example, amongst other devices, it provided
for the reduction of judicial fees, an increase in attorney fees in case
of an appeal, attorney fee-shifting, and fines in cases of noncompliance with performance (CPC/15, arts. 98-102 and 85).48
The Employment Law Reform limited gratuitous justice to those
who have an income below 40% of the highest income of the
Brazilian equivalent of Social Security.49 The trend to limit
gratuitous judicial fees to people without financial means is solid.
The main concern is to find a balance between the fees charged
and the amount spent by the states with the judicial system,
discourage frivolous litigation, and offer free judicial services to

Nacional de Justiça) is a branch of the Federal Court’s Council (Conselho da
Justiça Federal)).
45
Ferraz & Moraes, supra note 43.
46
See Bruno Lourenço, CCJ Aprova Fim da Isenção Irrestrita de Custas
Judiciais nos Juizados Especiais, RÁDIO SENDAO (May 17, 2019, 2:21 PM),
https://www12.senado.leg.br/radio/1/noticia/ccj-aprova-fim-da-isencaoirrestrita-de-custas-judiciais-nos-juizados-especiais.
47
See Thiago Resende, Worker May Have to Pay Costs of Proceedings Against
the INSS, FOLHA DE S.PAULO, (Nov. 28, 2019, 2:00 AM),
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2019/11/trabalhador-podera-ter-debancar-custos-de-processos-contra-o-inss.shtml.
48
See Lei No. 13.105, de 16 de Março de 2015, art. 85 & 98-102, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
49
The highest income for retirees in 2020 is about $2,000 USD a month. See Lei
No 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, Art. 790 §3, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 9.8.1943 (Braz.).
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those who need it.50 Since access to justice for people with financial
needs is a constitutional guarantee, even if some of these changes
are constitutionally dubious, there is no doubt about the direction of
the winds.
III

THE MAIN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS THAT PROVIDE ACCESS TO
JUSTICE IN BRAZIL (PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND PUBLIC
DEFENDERS) AND THE COST OF LITIGATING IN BRAZIL
Before we discuss the main issues, we need to address the issue
of access to justice. Brazil has a broad array of procedural rules and
proceedings designed for the protection of people who are
procedurally vulnerable, such as groups of litigants with difficulty
to organize themselves, employees, consumers, victims of
environmental disasters, poor people, people with disabilities,
minors, and the elderly (both in individual and class-action
conflicts). After a long military dictatorship (between 1964 and
1985), democracy was re-established in Brazil at a time when the
worldwide movement for access to justice was at its strongest.51 As
expected, the country was deeply influenced by the access to justice
ideal of the mid-1970s to early 1980s.52 As a result of this worldwide
50

See Revisão das Normas Relativas à Cobrança de Custas dos Servicaos
Forenses da Concessão dos Beneficios da Justiça Gratuita, CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.cnj.jus.br/agendas/revisaodas-normas-relativas-a-cobranca-de-custas-dos-servicos-forenses-da-concessaodos-beneficios-da-justica-gratuita/.
51
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247.
52
Id.; see also CARLOS ALBERTO ALVARO DE OLIVEIRA, MAURO CAPPELLETTI E
O DIREITO PROCESSUAL BRASILEIRO, 45 (Revista da Faculdade de Direito da
UFRGS) (2001) (The Italian jurist Mauro Cappelletti was the person who most
strongly influenced this worldwide tendency.); HERMES ZANETI JR., A
CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO: O MODELO CONSTITUCIONAL DA
JUSTIÇA BRASILERIA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE PROCESSO E CONSTITUIÇÃO 154
(2nd ed. 2014); see also DIERLE JOSÉ COELHO NUNES & LUDMILA FERREIRA
TEIXEIRA, ACESSO À JUSTIÇA DEMOCRÁTICO, 44 (2013) (There is a strong
correlation between the conclusions of the Florence Project and the Welfare
State, and this correlation must be updated. Since the social model of State is
replaced in all contemporary democracies by a deliberative-procedimental
democracy model, we need to combine the social investments of the Social State
with the personal responsibilities of the Liberal State, granting more liberty at
lesser cost, with a change in the size of the State and investment in preferred
areas and the creation of independent control agencies. This, however, does not
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movement, the main concern of the Brazilian legislature during the
process of re-democratization of the state was to ensure broad access
to justice, which was effectuated through guarantees in the 1988
Constitution.53
The guarantee of access to justice was therefore written into the
Constitution and the procedural rules, ensuring free legal protection.
Article 5, LXXIV, of the Brazilian Constitution, states that “the
State will provide integral and free legal assistance to those with
insufficient means”.54 Some of the benefits for the poor include the
waiving of court and expert fees and the waiving of fee-shifting.55
These benefits are also available for class actions. 56 Additionally,
the Constitution created public institutions to guarantee access to
justice.57
The 1988 Constitution assigned to the Public Prosecutors
(Ministerio Publico) the broad power to act for the protection of
fundamental individual rights which are nonwaivable (droit
indisponible) and rights of social interest of diffuse and collective
character.58 Therefore, Brazilian Public Prosecutors must act not
only in the criminal arena, or the traditional protection of the family
and orphans, but also for the protection of a broad array of rights.
They commonly bring lawsuits in the areas of health, education, the
environment, and for the protection of the elderly, disabled, minors,
consumers, and workers.
To discharge their functions, the Public Prosecutors may bring
individual lawsuits, class actions, and intervene in proceedings as
affect the correctness of some of the premises of the Florence Project, which
analyzed the problem of access to justice from a multidisciplinary approach
(economic, sociologic, politic, etc.) and appointed as among the areas in need of
reform: simplification, de-judicialization, and de-bureaucratization of the access
to justice, from the perspective of the consumers of the justice system, not its
operators. These premises are as valid today as they were in 1978.)
53
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247.
54
Id.; see also FREDIE DIDIER, JR. & RAFAEL ALEXANDRIA DE OLIVEIRA,
BENEFÍCIO DA JUSTIÇA GRATUITA 11 (3rd. ed. 2008).
55
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247.
56
See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, Art. 18, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 25.7.1985 (Braz.).
57
See infra p. 36, especially the comments on public prosecutors and public
defenders’ role under the constitutional provisions.
58
See Hermes Zaneti Júnior, O MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO E O NOVO PROCESSO CIVIL
(2018).
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custos legis.59 The role of the Public Prosecutors in the protection of
group rights (diffuse and collective) against the State is possible
only because of the constitutional guarantees of independence and
specialization.60
The Constitution also granted Public Defenders (Defensoria
Publica) the role of representing the interest of people who are
economically and legally in need.61 The representation is broad and
can be judicial or extrajudicial, through individual lawsuits or class
actions in the civil and criminal spheres.62
Public Prosecutors and Public Defenders operate both in the
federal system and in the systems of the several states.63 Therefore,
there are Federal and State Public Prosecutors and Defenders.
These institutions have been recently improved, with extensive
public investments and changes to their structure to guarantee
administrative and financial autonomy from the three branches of
government, particularly the Executive. This was the result of strong
lobbying, first on the part of the Public Prosecutors, then of the
Public Defenders. The institutions that present the largest growth
now are the Public Defenders.64 This growth is the result of political
retaliation because Public Prosecutors have clashed with the highest

59

Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 379-82 (2003)
(discussing this peculiar position of Public Prosecutors from Brazil in a
comparative perspective); Antonio Herman Benjamin, Group Action and
Consumer Protection in Brazil, in THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE (ED.), GROUP
ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 141, 153 (1992) (showing that, as
contrasted to their European counterparts, Brazilian Public Prosecutors are
active in the protection of group rights); Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in
Brazil, 15 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 1, 66 (1988) (discussing Public
Prosecutors in Brazil).
60
MAURO CAPPELLETTI, DIMENSIONI DELLA GIUSTIZIA NELLA SOCIETÀ
CONTEMPORANEE 110 (1994); see also ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE
PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO 400-18 (Editora Forense, 1st ed. 2008) (providing a
critical view).
61
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 134 (Braz.).
62
Id.
63
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 127-29, 134 (Braz.).
64
See generally, Lígia Mori Madeira, Institutionalization, Reform and
Independence of the Public Defender’s Office in Brazil, BRAZ. POL. SCI. REV. 48
(2014).

64

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:49

levels of government through anti-corruption operations, such as
Lava-Jato.65
The evolution has been quick. The Office of the Public
Prosecutors already has full administrative and financial autonomy
from the branches of government.66 This autonomy is essential
because the Constitution gives it the ability to police the other state
agencies’ compliance with the Constitution, and with respect to
fundamental rights (Articles. 127, 129, II e IX, CF/88).67 Moreover,
each public prosecutor is independent from the Chief Public
Prosecutor in the same way that judges are independent from the
Chief Justice of a tribunal (Articles. 127(1), 129(4) e 93, CF/88).68
With these constitutional changes, the Office of the Public
Prosecutors no longer belongs to the Executive branch (as it did in
the past), and instead exists as an autonomous institution, one that is
indispensable to the administration of justice.69
The development of the Office of the Public Defenders is more
recent, although it was provided for in the 1988 Constitution (Article
134, CF/88).70 Its administrative and functional autonomy is assured
by the Constitution.71 Recent constitutional reform has conferred
upon the Public Defenders' guarantees that are similar to those
conferred upon the Judiciary and Prosecutors. Article 134 states,
somewhat poetically, that
“the Office of the Public Defenders is a permanent
institution, essential to the jurisdictional function of
the State, which has the objective, as an expression
and instrument of the democratic regime, of giving
legal orientation, promoting human rights and
protection in all court instances, judicial and
extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights,
Bryan Harris, Lead Prosecutor Quits Brazil’s ‘Lava Jato’ Probe, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/20dffdd9-05e6-442a-a1acc25335a863b6.
66
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 127, §§ 2º-6º (Braz.).
67
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 247-48.
70
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 134 (Braz.).
71
Id.
65
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in a form comprehensive and gratuitous to people in
need ....... ” 72
Even though it is a necessary development for the full
development of Brazilian society, the constitutional principle of
broad access to justice, together with the maintenance of the public
institutions that provide that access (Public Prosecutor and Public
Defender), represents a major direct cost to the judicial system. But
the costs also rise indirectly. The independence of the Public
Prosecutor and the Public Defender means that they will bring
lawsuits against the federal, state, and city governments. These
lawsuits, some of them class actions, lead to major expenses with
the construction of schools, hospitals, prisons, etc., and with damage
claims against the State.73
This litigation is a necessary development because of the
constant failure of the government in effectuating the public policies
adopted in the Constitution of 1988 and subsequent statutes, as well
as the bad management of the Public Administration, which
perpetuates a vicious circle caused by the State’s failure to
administratively protect citizen’s rights when violated. There is a
recent tendency to reduce this autophagic litigation, raising the selfcontrol of the Public Administration by the recognition of
administrative precedents (Article 496(4), IV, CPC/2015) and
through alternative dispute resolution (Article 174, CPC/2015).74
On the other hand, litigation in Brazil is still comparatively
cheap. In many situations, the law provides for a waiver of court
fees, which are usually necessary to finance the cost of the judicial
72

Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248.
See Paulo CEZAR PINHEIRO CARNEIRO, ACESSO À JUSTIÇA 182 (2003)
(discussing a study conducted in Rio de Janeiro according to which 90% of the
class actions were brought by the State and one-third of all class actions were
brought against the State); see also GEISA DE ASSIS RODRIGUES, AÇÃO CIVIL
PÚBLICA E TERMO DE AJUSTAMENTO DE CONDUTA 271-73 (Editora Forense ed.,
2nd ed. 2006) (discussing a study according to which two thirds of all class
actions settled extra procedurally by the Public Prosecutors (compromisso de
ajustamento de conduta) were signed with the State or institutions connected to
the State); see also ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL
COLETIVO 404 (Editora Forense ed., 1st ed. 2008) (providing critical
perspective).
74
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248-49.
73

66

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:49

system.75 Even when there is payment of costs, the costs are low and
independent from the value or complexity of the proceeding.76 The
judiciary laws of each state set a maximum amount for these costs,
which ultimately results in disproportionately low fees paid for
expensive and complex cases involving a considerable amount of
money.77 The Supreme Court decided that state laws that do not
limit the amount of court fees are an unconstitutional violation of
the principle of broad access to justice.78 However, attitudes are
currently trending away from the principle of broad access to justice
as a result of the economic crisis and the indebtedness of the states.
Even the attorney fees of private lawyers are generally low
because of the large number of lawyers and the availability of public
defenders.79
A few years ago we could say that Brazil was going in the
opposite direction of international law reform and raising expenses
with the judicial system.80 The current tendency, however, is to
become more aware of the cost of the system of justice. The
difference between the situation in 2014 and 2020 is striking. This
contrast can be explained in several ways.
First, Brazil experienced considerable economic growth in the
past decades.81 By inserting itself in the international market, Brazil
broadened access to products and services for a major part of the
population that was below the line of poverty in the 1970s, who now
account for a meaningful portion of a budding consumer market.82
For example, Brazil has witnessed the steady increase of the socalled “Class C” (the group of people and families with a monthly
income per capita of between $90 and $430), which today represents
75

Id. This is the case of small claim courts, the legal aid for the poor and the
class actions fee system.
76
Justiça Em Números 2020 Súmario Executivo, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE
JUSTIÇA,
https://paineis.cnj.jus.br/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=qvw_l%2FPainel
CNJ.qvw&host=QVS%40neodimio03&anonymous=true&sheet=shResumoDes
pFT (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
77
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248-49.
78
See, e.g., S.T.F., ADI 4186/RO, Relator: Roberto Barroso, 10.12.2018 (Ro.).
79
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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54% of the Brazilian population and will spend 1.17 trillion Reals
in 2014 (about half a trillion USD).83
However, the current reality is different, and the numbers are
different. A crisis haunts the country, and the Federal Government
adopted a political orientation more in line with the market and the
economy than with social rights. The data points to an increase in
extreme poverty that afflicts 13.5 million people.84
Second, Brazil has always been a country with sharp financial
inequality (austerity-necessity).85 European countries prospered
after World War II and could afford to provide their people with a
series of social benefits but now need to curb them.86 Brazil, on the
other hand, only just started distributing these benefits and may face
a similar problem (austerity-control).87 Today, the need to control
public finances is strong. The federal public debt has reached a
record high of over 4 Trillion Reals (roughly equivalent to $1.2
trillion USD).88 It would have been higher, but the federal
government took austerity measures, including the control of public
expenses and reduction of banking interest rates (responsible for the

83

See Mário Braga, 54% dos brasileiros formam a classe C, diz Serasa
Experian, EXAME (Feb. 18, 2014, 2:09 PM) https://exame.com/economia/54dos-brasileiros-formam-a-classe-c-diz-serasa-experian/ (stating that if the
Brazilian Class C were a country, it would be the twelfth most populous with
108 million people, and the eighteenth in consumption, representing 58% of the
credit in the country).
84
See Carla Jiménez, Extrema pobreza sobe e Brasil já soma 13,5 milhões de
miseráveis, EL PAIS (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:35 AM),
https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/11/06/politica/1573049315_913111.html.
85
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248; see also LILIA M. SCHWARCZ AND
HELOISA M. STARLING. BRASIL: UMA BIOGRAFIA 172 (2015) (English
publication available at: LILIA M. SCHWARCZ AND HELOISA M. STARLING,
BRAZIL: A BIOGRAPHY, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018))
(discussing how Brazil since D. João is in debt with foreign countries).
86
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248; see also L. Buendía, P.J. Gómez
Serrano & R. Molero-Simarro, Gone with the Crisis? Welfare State Change in
Europe Before and Since the 2008 Crisis, 150 SOC. INDIC. RES. 243–264 (2020)
(available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-020-02286-y) (It is a well-known
and debated trend, not only provoked by 2008 crisis.).
87
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248.
88
Brazil National Government Debt, CEIC,
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/brazil/national-government-debt (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020).
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interest rates of its own debt).89 Several states, who are facing
difficulties to pay public workers, have started dismantling the
populations’ essential services.90
Third, Brazilian politics, since the re-democratization in the
1980s, has taken a consistent turn to the left, adopting several
policies of social inclusion.91 Currently, the Federal Government is
led by a group aligned with economic liberalism and conservative
customs. President Jair Bolsonaro openly opposes the left-wing
Worker’s Party, who governed the country in the previous years.92
None of these former paths were wrong. On the contrary, social
inclusion and effectiveness of rights are investments, not costs. 93
But Brazilians must acknowledge that these goals must not be
pursued only in the Judiciary. Otherwise, the cost of the Judiciary
Branch may lead to less effectiveness in the protection of these
rights. The Brazilian Judiciary has acted as the driving force behind
social equality and must continue to play this role. But we must
consider alternatives to the judicial solution, and even alternatives

89

See e.g., Idiana Tomazelli & Lorenna Rodrigues, 'Nós vamos derrubar a
dívida pública', diz Guedes, UOL (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/estadao-conteudo/2020/11/06/nos-vamosderrubar-a-divida-publica-diz-guedes.htm?cmpid=copiaecola (specifically the
recent comments of Paulo Guedes, Economy Minister, to control the public debt
in times of COVID-19).
90
See, e.g., Fernando Ferreira Filho and Volnei Piccolotto, A Dívida Pública do
Rio Grande do Sul: uma análise sob a Ótica da Hipótese de Fragilidade
Financeira de Minks, ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA, PORTO ALEGRE, V. 36, N. 71, P. 295322, SET. 2018 (arguing that the policy of privatizations and concessions of
public services, however, did not result in reduction of public debt in the State of
Rio Grande do Sul).
91
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248.
92
See John Cherian, Brazil on the Rampage, FRONTLINE (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article26004053.ece.
93
See LUIGI FERRAJOLI, LA DEMOCRAZIA ATTRAVERSO I DIRITTI. IL
COSTITUZIONALISMO GARANTISTA COME MODELLO TEORICO E COME PROGETTO
POLITICO 154-155 (2013) (arguing that the economic crisis and the weakening
of fundamental rights in Europe led to an increase of social inequality. In
opposition to the neoliberal thought, the author defends that it was the European
investment in social rights that allowed its growth after the World War II.); see
also LUIGI FERRAJOLI, A DEMOCRACIA ATRAVÉS DOS DIREITOS. O
CONSTITUCIONALISMO GARANTISTA COMO MODELO TEÓRICO E COMO PROJETO
POLÍTICO (2015).
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to public solutions, to ensure the effectiveness of the fundamental
rights while reducing costs and increasing efficiency.
In this new situation, the importance of the Judiciary is to
guarantee fundamental rights without unnecessarily increasing
costs. The Judiciary must be able to manage its budget, protect
fundamental rights, and assure access to justice for all (not only
those with access to the Judiciary), without overburdening the
Executive branch and the market, while at the same time forging a
sustainable economic environment.
IV
NO TRADITION OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN BRAZIL AND
NEW TRENDS: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE (CNJ) AND THE
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE JUDICIARY (ADJ)
When we first addressed this issue in 2014, we mentioned a
recent surge of statistical studies concerning the efficiency of the
Brazilian justice system.94 In the last six years, the reality has
evolved.95

94

Many Brazilian scholars, such as Barbosa Moreira, have complained for
decades about the lack of judicial statistics. See Jose Carlos Barbosa Moreira, A
Emenda Constitucional nº 45 e o Processo, in JOSE CARLOS BARBOSA
MOREIRA, 9 TEMAS DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 21-36, esp. 31 ff (2007).
95
Law 11.364.2006 created the Department of Judicial Research (“DPJ”), which
produces the annual report Justice in Numbers, and discusses the performance of
the courts. Lei No. 11.364, de 26 de Outubro de 2006, DIÀRIO OFICIAL DO
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.10.2006 (Braz.). The most recent report was published in
2020, where the Judiciary made the data available in a searchable form that
shows a picture of the expenses with the Judiciary and the lawsuits divided into
various classes and subjects. See Justiça em Números, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE
JUSTIÇA,
https://paineis.cnj.jus.br/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=qvw_l/PainelCN
J.qvw&host=QVS@neodimio03&anonymous=true&sheet=shResumoDespFT
(last visited Aug. 30, 2020). The National Council of Public Prosecutors
(“CNMP”) now publishes a report called “Public Prosecutors: A Picture”
(Ministério Público: Um Retrato), with data collected from all Office of Public
Prosecutors in all states and federal. See Conselho Nacional do Ministério
Público, Ministério Público um Retrato 2018 (Assessoria de Comunicação do
CNMP, 2018),
https://www.cnmp.mp.br/portal/images/Publicacoes/documentos/2019/Anu%C3
%A1rio_um_retrato_2018_ERRATA_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2020). The
current situation is much more advanced than in 2014, but it is still possible to
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Being a diverse country with disparate regional realities,
continental dimensions (Brazil is larger than the continental U.S.
and Europe), and a population of more than 210 million,96 judicial
statistics are still difficult to gather, and the numbers are difficult to
interpret.
The 2004 Constitutional reform of the Judiciary (EC 45/2004)
created public entities to exercise external control of the Judiciary
and the Public Prosecutors (Ministério Público).97 Article 103-B of
the Constitution established the National Council of Justice
(Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ), and Article 130-A established
the National Council of Public Prosecutors (Conselho Nacional do
Ministério Público, CNMP).98 The objective was to harmonize and
standardize the services that provide access to justice and provide
effective control of these services. The Constitutional Reform also
created a special department under the Ministry of Justice: the
Secretary of the Reform of the Judiciary (Secretaria de Reforma do
Poder Judiciário). The Secretary of the Reform of the Judiciary was
a permanent entity responsible for centralizing and proposing
governmental initiatives to improve procedural rules and access to
justice. Because of budget limitations, the government extinguished
the Secretary of the Reform of the Judiciary in 2016 transferring its
role to the National Secretary of Justice (Secretaria Nacional de
Justiça).99 The creation of these organizations has led to positive
results – all of them produce statistics that measure the efficiency of
the Brazilian system of justice and offer concrete data to support law
reform.
In 2013, The Ministry of Justice published an Atlas of the
Judiciary, showing the proportion of judges, public prosecutors,
criticize the initiative regarding the completeness of the data and inconsistencies
in how it is fed.
96
Population, Total – Brazil, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BR%20.-BR (last
visited Sep. 19, 2020).
97
See Emenda Constitucional No 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2004 (Braz.).
98
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A, 103-B (Braz.).
99
See Sérgio Renault, Pierpaolo Cruz Bottini & Maria Tereza Sadek, Fim da
Secretaria de Reforma do Judiciário é uma perda importante, CONSULTOR
JURÍDICO (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-mar-30/fimsecretaria-reforma-judiciario-perda-importante.
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lawyers, and public defenders in the country.100 According to the
data for 2013, Brazil has approximately 625,000 lawyers, 17,100
judges, 14,070 public prosecutors, and 6,030 public defenders for
201 million inhabitants.101
But even good initiatives have negative consequences. As a
contradictory and vicious circle, constitutionally guaranteed broad
access to justice leads to a proliferation of lawsuits, which in turn
burdens the judiciary and limits the reach of the constitutionally
guaranteed ideal. CNJ research has demonstrated what we already
knew: the major litigants in Brazilian civil justice are from the public
sector in all its areas (cities, states, and the federal government), and
from financial institutions (banks, insurance, and credit card
companies).102
It is ironic to see the State as the main culprit for overburdening
the judiciary. The State, to avoid spending money, refuses to comply
with its obligations and behaves illegally against its citizens, forcing
them to turn to the Judiciary for help. This behavior is selfdestructive because it not only increases the expenses of the judicial
system, but also overburdens it with unnecessary work that brings
the economy to a halt, makes the country less competitive, generates
less wealth, and consequently raises fewer taxes.
The overburdening of Brazilian courts created by the broad
access to justice guaranteed in the Constitution has led to the current
tendency of the Brazilian civil procedure system to create “model
proceedings,” “pilot cases,” or “test cases” for the aggregation and
resolution of repetitive claims.103 A CNJ study shows the impact that
See Danyelle Simōes, Atlas é o Maior Banco de Dados Sobre a Justiça No
Brazil, MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA E SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA (Dec. 16, 2013),
https://www.justica.gov.br/news/atlas-e-o-maior-banco-de-dados-sobre-ajustica-no-brasil-1.
101 Id.
102
See 100 Maiores Litigantes, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2012),
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/100_maiores_litigantes.pdf.
103
Antonio do Passo Cabral, A Escolha da Causa-Piloto nos Incidentes de
Resolução de Processos Repetitivos 231 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 201 (2014);
Antonio do Passo Cabral, O Novo Procedimento-Modelo (MusterVerfahren)
Alemão: Uma Alternativa às Ações Coletivas, 147 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 123
(2007) (The new CPC/2015 provided for two types of repetitive cases (Art.
928): (a) an incident for the resolution of repetitive cases (IRDR) and (b) the
repetitive special and extraordinary appeals (REER)).
100
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repetitive claims have on the slowing of the Brazilian civil justice
system and highlights the need to adopt standardized proceedings to
resolve repetitive conflicts.104
Another CNJ initiative to promote efficiency in the Judiciary
was the general report comparing data on the experience of selected
countries with the evaluation of the performance of the Judiciary.105
The study shows that the new trend is to evaluate the performance
of the Judiciary. This kind of study was absorbed by a broader study
called “Justice in Numbers” (Justiça em Números)106 and the
Performance Evaluation of the Judiciary.107
The 2011 Performance Evaluations pointed to negative and
positive aspects of the performance evaluation.108 For example, one
negative aspect that led to resistance from legal professionals
against the evaluation was that the criteria did not take into account
that different proceedings have different levels of complexity.109
Furthermore, it is not possible to adopt uniform criteria without
taking into consideration the differences between complex
proceedings, (like class actions and bankruptcy) and simpler
proceedings (like family conflicts and collection claims). This kind
of problem persists given the difficulty to adjust the complexity of
each case to the performance of each judge.
Another negative concern is that the evaluation could lead to a
weakening of judicial independency: judges would seek to increase
productivity by automatizing decisions. This concern is still valid
104

See Demandas Repetitivas e a Morosidade na Justiça cível Brasileira,
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Julio 2011), https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/pesq_sintese_morosidade_dpj.pdf; see also Relatório
do Banco Nacional de Dados de Demandas Repetitivas e Precedentes
Obrigatórios, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTICA (2018),
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/03a6c043d7b9946768ac79a7a94309af.pdf.
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See AVALIAÇÃO DO DESEMPENHO JUDICIAL: DESAFIOS, EXPERIÊNCIAS,
INTERNACIONAIS E PERSPECTIVAS, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2011),
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/40-211-1-PB.pdf.
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See generally Justiça Em Números 2019 Súmario Executivo, CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/conteudo/arquivo/2019/08/8ee6903750bb4361b5d0d1932ec663
2e.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
107 Id.
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See AVALIAÇÃO DO DESEMPENHO JUDICIAL, supra note 105.
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but has significantly reduced in past years. Younger judges are
better adapted to the tools of electronic proceedings and tend to be
more attentive to the effective management of their caseload.
On the other hand, the evaluation may bring advantages:
implementing qualitative and quantitative controls, as well as
incentives, to judicial productivity may improve the results of
judicial activity by providing transparency, speed, efficiency, legal
certainty, and a reduction in the amount of litigation. This method
would simultaneously accomplish both important elements of legal
reform in Brazil: efficiency and legal certainty.
The implementation of the taxonomy and the controls by means
of electronic reports periodically sent to the court and then to the
CNJ to feed Justice in Numbers led to a major transformation. Now,
a judge may obtain information in real-time about the volume and
type of cases in his or her court, as well as the status of each
proceeding just by accessing the court’s website.110 These electronic
reports also allow tribunals to oversee the online work of judges.111
This implementation also sheds light on basic questions like the
duration and cost of proceedings in Brazil. According to the report
Justice in Numbers, the average time between the filing of the
complaint and the judgment has increased between 2015 and
2018.112
According to same report, the average duration of a proceeding
from the filing of a complaint to the res judicata, after all appeals,
is 3 years and 8 months.113 This duration is a frustratingly long time
to wait to have one’s right formally recognized in court. But this
information is meaningless. In the Brazilian system, a plaintiff may
have his or her right recognized in court, but not have his or her right
realized in practice. In most cases, including when the defendant is
the government, after res judicata, plaintiffs still need to begin a
proceeding to judicially enforce the judgment before the defendants
110

See Brazil: Federal Supreme Court Launches Central Database, LIBR. OF
CONG. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/brazilfederal-supreme-court-launches-central-database/.
111
See Monthly Productivity Module, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA,
https://www.cnj.jus.br/pesquisas-judiciarias/modulo-de-produtividade-mensal/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
112
See Justiça Em Números 2019, supra note 106, at 8.
113
See Justiça em Números 2019, supra note 106.
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comply.114 The average duration of the enforcement proceeding
from the time of res judicata until its closure, is 8 years and 1 month
in the Federal Justice and 6 years and 2 months in the State
Justice.115 This time is in addition to the 3 years and 8 months
mentioned above. Moreover, in addition to a long and frustrating
wait, a final resolution may never come to fruition. These statistics
do not show the number of enforcement proceedings that were
closed unsuccessfully; many enforcement proceedings were
abandoned because the court was not able to locate any property
belonging to the defendant.116
As if these numbers were not sufficiently depressing, they fail to
reflect reality because these averages also include small claims
courts, which are speedier and less generous with appeals. 117 In the
regular justice system, the rule is that almost all judgments are
appealed and need to be enforced judicially.118 There is yet another
distortion: the averages also include lawsuits that were dismissed
early in the proceeding,119 further pushing the numbers artificially
down. Therefore, the real average duration of a proceeding for the
regular justice system is much higher than reported.
Those are the reasons why the current 2020 Justice in Numbers
report (referring to 2019) separated the numbers from the regular
justice system and the small claims courts.
Below is the average duration of each proceeding in the regular
justice system, excluding those dismissed early in the proceeding:
First instance: 3 years and 11 months
Second instance: 2 years and 1 month
Enforcement: 7 years
Average duration of proceedings in small claims courts:
First instance: 1 year and 8 months
Second instance: 2 years and 3 months
Enforcement: 1 year and 9 months
This new way of reporting the data confirms what everyone
knew in practice: (1) that proceedings in the small claims courts are
114

Id.
Id.
116
See generally Justiça em Números 2019, supra note 106.
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faster than in the regular justice system, and (2) that excluding cases
of early dismissal would give a more accurate average of duration
of proceedings.120
As has been the premise of this article all along, there is a cost
in maintaining these judicial proceedings for so long. There is an
obvious cost for the interested parties, but there is also a cost for the
economy of the country in the face of an ineffective legal system.
And there is a cost in the administration of justice because courts are
backlogged, heavy and slow, and demand more materials and more
personnel. Thus, we all lose.
Today, we know how much the justice system in Brazil costs.
According to Justice in Numbers, the total expenses with the
Judiciary correspond to 1.4% of GDP or 2.6% of the total expenses
of the Union, the state, and the municipalities.121 In 2018, the cost
for the justice system was 449.53 Reals.122 This cost is not a huge
amount taken out of context: it is a mere $150 USD. But, it becomes
a significant amount considering that it is about half the monthly
minimum wage.123
Unfortunately, the report does not offer precise information
about the average cost of legal proceedings. But one may use the
overall expenses of the Federal Courts to arrive at an estimated cost
of about 7.252 Reals (about $2,500 USD) per proceeding.124
Another official study identified the average duration of tax
enforcement proceedings in federal courts.125 According to the
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See generally Justiça Em Números 2020 Súmario Executivo, CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/WEB_V2_SUMARIO_EXECUTIVO_CNJ_JN2020.p
df (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); see also Erik Navarro, ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO
PROCESSO CIVIL: COMO A ECONOMIA, O DIREITO E A PSICOLOGIA PODEM
VENCER A “TRAGÉDIA DA JUSTIÇA” 56-61 (2020).
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See Justiça Em Números 2020, supra note 120.
122 Id.
123
See Justiça Em Números 2019, supra note 106.
124
See Hermes Zaneti Jr. and Gustavo Mattedi Reggiani, Estabilização da
Tutela Antecipada Antecedente e Incidental: Sugestões Pragmáticas para
Respeitar a Ideologia de Efetividade do CPC/2015, 284 R.T. 213 (2018)
(considering twelve years and nine months as the average duration of a
proceeding in Federal Courts, from filing to enforcement).
125
See A EXECUÇAO FISCAL NO BRASIL E O IMPACTO NO JUDICIÁRIO, CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2011), https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-
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study, the average duration of judicial tax enforcement proceedings
is 8 years, 2 months, and 9 days per proceeding, and the average cost
is about 4,685.39 Reals per proceeding approximately $1,976
USD).126 Since the average collection claim is 22,507.51 Reals
(about $9,537 USD), the average cost of tax enforcement
proceedings in Brazil represents almost a quarter of the average
value of the lawsuit.127 Considering that cost is merely the expense
incurred by the Judiciary, (it does not include the cost incurred by
the Administration) and the value refers to the total value of the
claim (not the amount actually collected), this data reveals that the
judicial service in tax enforcement proceedings is very expensive.
Therefore, this data demonstrates that it is necessary to correct
something in the investment in access to justice, where we could
spend less while still creating a more efficient justice system. This
study led to legislative bills seeking to dejudicialize the enforcement
of tax and other governmental credits (known as fiscal enforcement
or execução fiscal).128
The problem of fiscal enforcement is particularly important
because these proceedings represent more than one-third of all
proceedings pending in Brazil. A legislative bill allowed arbitration
and private enforcement of the debt.129 In the introduction to the bill,
content/uploads/2011/02/2d53f36cdc1e27513af9868de9d072dd.pdf (discussing
fiscal enforcement, especially the research done by UFRGS and IPEA).
126
See CUSTO UNITÁRIO DO PROCESSO DE EXECUÇÃO FISCAL NA JUSTIÇA
FEDERAL, IPEAL INSITUTO DE PESQUISA ECONÕMICA EPLICADA (Mar. 31,
2011),
https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/comunicado/110331_comu
nicadoipea83.pdf.
127
Id.; see also A EXECUÇAO FISCAL NO BRASIL E O IMPACTO NO JUDICIÁRIO,
supra note 128.
128
See Senador Antonio Anastasia (PSDB/MG), Projeto de Lei No. 4257, de
2019, SENADO FEDERAL, https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleggetter/documento?dm=7984784&ts=1594035701857&disposition=inline.
129
Projeto de Lei 6.204/2019, available at
https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/139971 V. Joel
Dias Figueiredo Júnior, O alvissareiro Projeto de Lei 6.204/19: desjudicialização
de títulos executivos civis e a crise da jurisdição estatal, GenJurídico, December
06, 2019, available at http://genjuridico.com.br/2019/12/06/projeto-de-lei-6204desjudicializacao/.
Luciano Athayde Chaves, A desjudicialização da execução: o Projeto de Lei nº
6.204/2019, Conjur, March 25, 2021, available at
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Congress cited information from the 2017 edition of Justice in
Numbers, which pointed to a 91% backlog in fiscal enforcement.130
This percentage means that out of each 100 proceedings of fiscal
enforcement in a year, only 9 are concluded. This percentage is the
highest backlog of any kind of proceeding in the Brazilian judicial
system.131
Overall, these studies are part of the movement started by the
three branches of government in the search of a more efficient and
secure Judiciary, but the results are not yet conclusive.
V
EFFICIENCY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY VERSUS COST: MAIN
ASPECTS OF THE SOLUTION OF THE “CRISIS” OF THE JUDICIARY AND
AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL INITIATIVE
In the 2014 version of this article, the main concern in Brazil
regarding the Judiciary was efficiency and legal certainty.132 In the
few years after that, the Brazilian Judiciary went through a
transformation derived from the change in the economic situation of
the country. The result is a new concern for austerity in public
expenses related to the Brazilian Justice System.133 It is now
concerned with data about the total cost and with Fiscal
Responsibility Law. All of this is in addition to the predominant
concern in 2014 of efficiency and legal certainty, considering that
these objectives are not contradictory, but complementary.
Several recent law reform initiatives, especially the new Code of
Civil Procedure (CPC/15), reveal a concern to provide techniques to
address simple matters, small claims, and special proceedings for
collecting debts based on documentary evidence.134 For example,
Congress improved the microsystem of small claims courts (called
“special civil courts” or juizados especiais cíveis) and created the
https://www.conjur.com.br/2021-mar-25/athayde-desjudicializacao-execucaopl-62042019.
130
See Justiça em Números 2017, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/b60a659e5d5cb79337945c1dd137496c.pdf (last visited
Apr. 26, 2021).
131
Id. at 113.
132
Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 245.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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“monitory action,” the binding precedents, and proceedings for the
aggregation and resolution of repetitive conflicts related only to
issues of law.135 Congress also increased the number of
‘extrajudicial executive titles’ or ‘extrajudicial enforcement
instruments’ (títulos executivos extrajudiciais), which are
documents, like checks, bills of exchange, some public documents,
and even some contracts, that are considered so certain that the
creditor may file enforcement proceedings directly, even in the
absence of a judgment (which is called “judicial executive title”).136
These procedural techniques increase the efficiency and legal
certainty of the Brazilian legal system because they promote a
speedy delivery of justice, make rights effective, reduce litigation,
and avoid contradictory judgments. Additionally, there is a
substantial ideological movement to reduce litigious culture through
mediation, conciliation, and reduced involvement of courts in
certain matters like family law and wills.137
Reduction of costs associated with the judicial activity is now
one of the main concerns in Brazil and is discussed in courts and the
CNJ.138 Both the courts and the CNJ have included in their agenda
considerations of cost and proportionality of the investment, without
disregarding the classic debate on procedural efficiency, legal
certainty, and access to justice..
As mentioned above, the need for the improvement of the
Brazilian Judiciary led to the creation of a special department under
the Ministry of Justice (Secretaria de Reforma do Poder Judiciario)
to be a permanent department responsible for centralizing and
proposing governmental initiatives to improve procedural rules and
access to justice. In 2004, the three branches of the Brazilian Federal
Government (the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary) got together
to sign a political agreement. This agreement was known as Pacto
Republicano (Republican Pact). The objective was to promote a

135
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Id.
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See C.P.C. 2015 art. 3 (recognizing as a fundamental norm, the
encouragement of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration and
consensual resolution (mediation, conciliation, etc.); see also CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, Res. 118.2014.
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speedy and efficient Judiciary.139 These efforts led to several law
reform initiatives. For example, the Code of Civil Procedure was
amended and the jurisdiction of small-claims courts was expanded.
These efforts led even to a major Constitutional Amendment (EC
45/2004).140
The Republican Pact had a powerful impact in Brazil. Despite
being a federal system, only the Federal Government may enact
legislation about procedural matters.141 This means that state courts
throughout Brazil apply the federally-enacted Code of Civil
Procedure in its state proceedings. Therefore, these initiatives had
a direct impact in every court in the country. These initiatives had
other objectives in addition to increase efficiency of the
jurisdictional services through prevention of conflicts and the
reasonable duration of process. They also intended to protect the
universal access to justice (especially of the poor), and to strengthen
the Rule of Law and the protection of human rights.142 Nowadays,
these measures are combined with a growing concern for austerity
and the cost for the system of justice, which is now intensely
discussed by the political community in Brazil, a sign of the
economic and fiscal crisis that affects the country.143
Furthermore, these concerns with efficiency and legal certainty
may be exaggerated. Several criticisms have been raised relating to
these law reforms because their excessive concern with efficiency
may deny certain procedural guarantees. But so far, the Brazilian
Constitutional Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) has maintained
the constitutionality of all procedural rules that have been
challenged.144 These criticisms may be extended to Article 8 of the
CPC/2015, which also refers to “efficiency.”145 These criticisms are
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See II Pacto Republicano de Estado por um Sistema de Justiça Mais
Acessível Ágil e Efetivo, PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA,
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Outros/IIpacto.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2020).
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See II Pacto Republicano de Estado, supre note XXXXX.
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See generally, id.
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See, e.g., ADI 5534, Rel. Dias Toffoli, j. 12.18.2020.
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correct because the protection of rights must be “effective” (which
is a legal concept), not “efficient” (which is an economic concept).
Therefore, the reduction of the costs of the Judiciary must be made
to guarantee a better result in the investments in the direct protection
of the rights, not in the reduction of this protection.146
Five years after the first Republican Pact was signed, the three
branches of government signed the Second Republican Pact.147 To
promote access to justice, it provided for the strengthening of the
Public Defenders and the devices that guarantee comprehensive
legal aid for the poor; a review of the class action statute to improve
the protection of the diffuse, collective, and homogeneous
individual rights and to obtain a more efficient judgment of mass
conflicts; and the creation of small-claims courts for use by
individuals and small companies (not large companies) against the
state and municipality.148 These priorities reveal the current
relevance of the Public Defenders, class actions, and the smallclaims courts.
There was no consensus in the Legislative Branch regarding
class action law reform; despite the production and broad discussion
regarding a bill proposing a new class action law, it was not
approved.149 But, the Second Republican Pact led to the enactment
of several statutes and yet another Constitutional Amendment
strengthening the Public Defenders and creating the small-claims
court for claims against states and municipalities.150 The creation in
2009 of courts for small claims against states and municipalities was
the direct result of the above-mentioned CNJ study that
protecting and promoting the dignity of the human being and observing
proportionality, reasonability, legality, publicity, and efficiency.”).
146
See Xandra Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, Austerity in Civil Procedure and
the Role of Simplified Procedures, 8 ERASMUS L. REV. 139, 145-46 (2015).
147
See II Pacto Republicano de Estado, supra note 142; see also Brazil: Reform
of the Judiciary, LIBR. OF CONG. (Apr. 24, 2009),
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/brazil-reform-of-the-judiciary/.
148 Id.
149
See ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO: A
CODIFICAÇÃO DAS AÇÕES COLETIVAS NO BRASIL (2008) (discussing and
criticizing the main projects for Class Action Codes in Brazil); see also FREDIE
DIDIER, JR. & HERMES ZANETI, JR., CURSO DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL:
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demonstrated that the public sector is one of the main litigators in
civil courts.151
After that, came more law reform. The Code of Civil Procedure
of 2015 provided that the Union, the states, and the municipalities
will create institutions to promote mediation and conciliation
(Article 174).152
Until recently, the debate in Brazil revolved around the
broadening of these simplified procedures and mass forms of legal
proceedings. The main scholarly concern was whether the excessive
simplification and massification may reduce the quality of
substantial justice, and whether it was a violation of the procedural
guarantees provided in the Brazilian Constitution.153 This issue was
the debate of the time, not austerity.
On the other hand, even with the recent creation of all these new
benefits, there is no corresponding increase in the value of court fees
and sometimes they are even waived by law for people without the
means to pay them.154 Moreover, the overall cost of litigation is
low.155 The tendency is to address this issue. With the crisis, one of
the main concerns is to make the Judiciary sustainable, if not selfsufficient, through judicial fees. There is a growing awareness that
extremely low judicial fees are an incentive for frivolous
litigation.156 We stated this concern in 2014: “This is a further
incentive to the proposal of meritless claims (by plaintiffs) and the
meritless resistance to the fulfillment of legitimate claims (by
defendants). In turn, these low fees overburden the Judiciary and
151
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the Judiciary collects 62.6% of its expenses), https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/relatorio_custas_processuais2019.pdf.
156
Fernanda Elisabeth Nöthen Becker & Alexandre Morais da Rosa, As Custas
Judiciais como Mecanismo de Desincentivo à Litigância Abusiva, ENAJUS
ENCONTRO DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DA JUSTIÇA,
https://www.enajus.org.br/2018/assets/sessoes/056_EnAjus.pdf (last visited Jan.
23, 2021).
152

82

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:49

increases the expenses, generating a vicious circle that is difficult to
stop.”157
Until recently, the need for austerity was not a part of the public
and political debate in Brazil. Even though the concept of austerity
is not limited to the global financial crisis that started in 2007, and
includes the need to reign in the judicial costs or the effects on
society in general and the parties in particular (companies,
consumers, and individuals), it had been completely ignored. These
effects are negative externalities and must be addressed because, in
the long run, they reduce the potential for economic development
and the distribution of wealth, further reducing the effectiveness of
the fundamental rights that the State must provide.
Below, we address the historical and sociological construction
of the Brazilian Justice system and its peculiarities, especially the
relationship between a constitutional order (strongly influenced by
the U.S. common law) and an infra-constitutional structure (with a
strong influence of the Continental European tradition).
Understanding these peculiarities is essential to forge the path for a
justice system that is speedy, cheap, efficient, and predictable,
without violating the substantial and procedural guarantees provided
for by the Constitution.
VI
THE PECULIARITIES OF THE BRAZILIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM:
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE VERSUS EUROPEAN
INFRA-CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Brazilian civil procedure (infra-constitutional rules) belongs
to the civil law tradition of Continental Europe, strongly influenced
by Portuguese,158 Italian,159 and German procedural traditions.
However, the Brazilian constitutional matrix was profoundly
influenced by the U.S. Constitution, including its judicial
157

Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 251.
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organization. The combination of influences is why Brazil does not
have an administrative justice system (the conflicts between private
parties and the State are decided by the Judiciary), and why there is
a broad possibility of judicial review (with judicial control of
administrative acts and a diffuse and concentrated review of
constitutionality of legislative acts by the Judiciary).160
This peculiarity generates a “methodological paradox.”161 Brazil
has an encompassing system of civil justice, in which the same judge
that decides conflicts between private parties also decides conflicts
between private parties and the state.162 Both are considered civil
claims and civil proceedings in a broad sense, and the civil
procedure adopted is the same.163 However, the first is regulated by
160
HERMES ZANETI JR. A CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO. O
MODELO CONSTITUCIONAL DA JUSTIÇA BRASILEIRA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE
PROCESSO E CONSTITUIÇÃO 5 (2014); see also VINCENZO VARRANO AND
VITTORIA BARSOTTI, 1 LA TRADIZIONE GIURIDICA OCCIDENTALI 508 (2010);
MARIO G. LOSANO, OS GRANDES SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS. INTRODUÇÃO AOS
SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS EUROPEUS E EXTRA-EUROPEUS 215 (2007) (American
comparative law scholars have also stressed the point as a significant gap
between Latin American models of power control and European models); see
also David S.Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America,
2 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL L.Q. 405-442 (1975).
161
See CANDIDO RANGEL DINAMARCO, 1 INSTITUIÇÕES DE DIREITO
PROCESSUAL CIVIL 176 (2003) (“[F]rom a global perspective, the Brazilian
procedural culture offers a major methodological problem because it accepts
concepts and proposals from European masters, especially Germans and Italians,
and at the same time, its political and constitutional formula of separation of
state powers resembles the North American model.”).
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HERMES ZANETI JR. A CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO. O
MODELOCONSTITUCIONAL DA JUSTIÇA BRASILEIRA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE
PROCESSO E CONSTITUIÇÃO 5 (2014); see also VINCENZO VARRANO AND
VITTORIA BARSOTTI, 1 LA TRADIZIONE GIURIDICA OCCIDENTALI 508 (2010);
MARIO G. LOSANO, OS GRANDES SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS. INTRODUÇÃO AOS
SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS EUROPEUS E EXTRA-EUROPEUS 215 (2007) (American
comparative law scholars have also stressed the point as a significant gap
between Latin American models of power control and European models); see
also David S.Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America,
2 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL L.Q. 405-442 (1975).
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private law, while the second is regulated by public law.164 The
peculiarities of the public law litigation are ignored, and both types
of litigation are regulated by liberal procedural guarantees that are–
–by design––predominantly concerned with private litigation.
Because of these characteristics, Brazilian judges have a central
role in conducting proceedings (although the procedural law is
detailed) with broad investigative powers, including their ability to
order the production of evidence sua sponte (Art. 370,
CPC/2015).165 The parties retain the initiative to request a response
from the Judiciary (principio da demanda, Article 2, CPC/2015),
but the proceedings progress by official decree (sua sponte), with a
strong trend to a public view of procedure.166
The Brazilian Justice system is concerned with the
implementation of the fundamental rights of liberty and social
rights, of groups and of individuals, for the protection of the
traditional subjective rights and of new legal situations that need
that materializes the harmonious combination of the main state functions
(legislating, executing the laws and applying them in specific cases).” (S.T.F. −
PET n. 1.302/DF. rel. Min. Maurício Correa, j. 02.03.2003).
164
See PONTES DE MIRANDA, 1 COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL
46 (1997) (“[T]he [Brazilian] civil procedure does not distinguish the type of
right or claim, whether it has a public or private nature, or whether it belongs to
a public or private party. European jurists, even the most advanced, have not yet
accepted the civil litigation in a broad sense, which is the Brazilian model,
which treats public law claims (even constitutional claims) the same way as
private law claims. The [Brazilian] system recognizes the hierarchy of legal
norms …, but establishes an equal justice under equal procedural law, except
insignificant exceptions.”).
165
See art. 370, caput, (“The judge must, ex officio [sponte sua] or at the request
of the party, determine what evidence is necessary for a judgment on the
merits.”), C.P.C, see Teresa Arruda Alvim; Fredie Didier Jr. (coord.) CPC
Brasileiro para a Língua Inglesa (2017).
166
See CANDIDO RANGEL DINAMARCO, INSTITUIÇÕES DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL
CIVIL 168 (2003). This trend will be reduced considerably with the new Code of
Civil Procedure of 2015. Some examples are the possibility of procedural
arrangements between the parties and the judge; see, e.g., C.P.C. art. 190 (Braz.)
(allowing the parties to change the proceeding); see also C.P.C. art. 191 (Braz.)
(allowing the parties and the judge to elaborate the calendar for the practice of
procedural acts); see also C.P.C. art 357(3) (stating that in complex cases the
judge will hold a hearing to hear the parties and build a procedural plan
together). At the same time, the difference between the public and the private in
civil procedure is losing its meaning.
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adequate judicial protection.167 Indeed, Brazil has one of the most
developed class action systems outside the common law tradition.168
Slowly, legal reform has directed the Brazilian procedural
system towards the resolution of repetitive claims and the
establishment of binding precedents, like appeals to the Superior
Tribunal of Justice (highest court for infra-constitutional matters)
and the Supreme Federal Court (highest court for constitutional
matters).169 Moreover, the bill for the New Code of Civil Procedure
provides for binding precedents, (Articles 926, 927, 489, § 1º, V and
VI) and a proceeding for the resolution of repetitive claims (Article
928).170
In this aspect, the Brazilian model is a hybrid between civil law
and common law; precedents in Brazil still have a predominantly
persuasive character, as is the rule in the civil law tradition.
However, even before the new Code of Civil Procedure, certain
types of precedent, such as the ones originating in a “repetitive
appeal” and súmulas vinculantes (see above), bind the Judiciary and
the Public Administration as long as the same issues of fact and law
are involved.171
Although it is a recent development, even the previous law
strengthened the normative force of court interpretation; an appeal
167

Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 252.
ANTONIO GIDI, A CLASS ACTION COMO INSTRUMENTO DE TUTELA COLETIVA
DOS DIREITOS. AS AÇÕES COLETIVAS EM UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA
(2007); see also ALUISIO GONÇALVES DE CASTRO MENDES, AÇÕES COLETIVAS
NO DIREITO COMPARADO E NACIONAL (2009); see also Gidi, supra note 149; see
also Zaneti & Didier, supra note 149.
169
See Daniel Mitidiero, The Ideal Court of Last Report A Court of
Interpretation and Precedent, 5 INT’L JOURNAL OF PROCEDURAL LAW 201-218
(2015); DANIEL MITIDIERO, CORTES SUPERIORES E CORTES SUPREMAS. DO
CONTROLE À INTERPRETAÇÃO, DA JURISPRUDENCIA AO PRECEDENTE (2013);
LUIS GUILHERME MARINONI, O STJ ENQUANTO CORTE DE PRECEDENTES (2013).
170
See Hermes Zaneti, Jr., IL VALORE VINCOLANTE DEI PRECEDENTI (2014)
(analyzing binding precedentes); see also HERMES ZANETI, Jr., O VALOR
VINCULANTE DOS PRECEDENTES: O MODELO GARANTISTA (MG) E A REDUÇÃO
DA DISCRICIONARIEDADE JUDICIAL: UMA TEORIA DOS PRECEDENTES
NORMATIVOS FORMALMENTE VINCULANTES (2014); also HERMES ZANETI, JR.,
O VALOR VINCULANTE DOS PRECEDENTES (2019).
171
See CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C. 1973] art. 518(1) (1973) (Braz.);
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988
[CONSTITUTION], art. 103-103(a).
168
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will not be allowed if an opinion is in agreement with a decision
(súmula) from the Superior Tribunal of Justice or the Supreme
Federal Court (Article 518(1), CPC/1973) and the organs of the
public administration are bound by decisions of concentrated
constitutional control and by súmulas vinculantes from the Supreme
Federal Court (Articles 103 and 103-A, CF/88).172
The trend is clearly towards further strengthening the binding
effect of decisions of superior courts and the techniques for the
resolution of repetitive litigation.173 The trend is also towards
strengthening the microsystem of small-claims courts.174 As we will
see below, in some kinds of small-claims courts there is already a
mechanism for the resolution of repetitive litigation. The new
Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 increased the power of
the judge and the parties, but also increased the judges’
responsibility and parties’ obligations.175
The trend is towards a more active control over the duration of
proceedings and over behavior against objective good faith and
cooperation.176 The 2015 Code provides sanctions for judges who
do not decide cases within a reasonable time without justification.177
These cases may be redistributed to another judge (CPC/2015, Art.
172

See id.
See S.T.F., Pleno, RE n. 655.265/RS, Rel. Min. Luiz Fux, Rel. para Acórdão
Min. Edson Fachin, j. 13.04.2016; see also STJ, AREsp n. 634.051/SP, Rel.
Min. Rogério Schietti Cruz, j. em 01.08.2017, DJE 07.08.2017 (“Maintaining
the factual and normative premises that guided that judgment, the Court's
conclusions (ratio decidendi) in the said declaratory action are reaffirmed (...)
The role of the Supreme Court's as an Apex Court requires it to give unity to the
law and maintain the stability to its precedents”).
174
See S.T.J., RCD na Rcl 14.730/SP, Rel. Ministro Mauro Campbell Marques,
Primeira Seção, julgado em 11.02.2015, DJe 24.02.2015 (considering different
laws as part of a microsystem); FELIPE BOHRING ROCHA. MANUAL DOS
JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS ESTADUAIS: TEORIA E PRÁTICA 20 (2016).
175
See Hermes Zaneti Jr., O Princípio da Cooperação e o Código de Processo
Civil: Cooperação para o Processo. In.: PAULO HENRIQUE DOS SANTOS LUCON;
JULIANA CORDEIRO DE FARIA; EDGARD AUDOMAR MARX NETO; ESTER CAMILA
GOMES NORATO REZENDE (ORG.). PROCESSO CIVIL CONTEMPORÂNEO.
HOMENAGEM AOS 80 ANOS DO PROFESSOR HUMBERTO THEODORO JÚNIOR 14253 (2018).
176
C.P.C. supra note 171, at art. 4, 5, 6, 12.
177
See art. 235, (notice to perform the act within ten (10) days, risk of
administrative sanctions, and, if the inaction persists, the case records are to be
sent to the legal substitute of the judge to be decided within ten (10) days).
173
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235).178 Parties may be sanctioned for not participating in the
settlement hearing, for abusive appeal, and for contempt of court.179
The general prohibition of acts against the justice system has been
timidly applied to sanction behavior against the good faith and
cooperation.180 This kind of sanction is necessary to encourage a
change in behavior.
John Sorabji warned:
The failure to secure a consistent approach to
compliance with case management and other
procedural obligations in England post-1999
exemplifies this difficulty. If the Brazilian courts are
to ensure the new CPC’s new case management
powers and contract procedure operate effectively,
they are likely to have to take a consistent approach
to the exercise of those powers and a similar
approach to non-compliance as the English courts
have since 2013 finally started to do. If they do not,
they run the risk of rendering the new forms of case
management and procedure dead letters: as nothing
more than the law on the page rather than the law in
action.181
For example, this new approach of English courts can be
confirmed in a recent English case, where the unreasonable refusal
to engage in mediation resulted in costs from the date the defendant

178

Id.
See id. at art. 233-35.
180
See STJ. REsp 1.628.065-MG. Rel. Paulo de Tarso Sanseverino, 3ª T, j.
02.21.2017; Jornada CEJ/CJF, “Enunciado 148: The reiteration by the creditor
or debtor of matters already mentioned may give rise to the imposition of a fine
for conduct contrary to good faith”; STJ, 2.ª Turma, REsp 1.676.027/PR, rel.
Min. Herman Benjamin, j. 26.09.2017, DJe 11.10.2017 (cooperation principle);
Frederico Augusto Leopoldino Koehler; Marco Aurélio Ventura Peixoto;
Silvano José Gomes Flumingnan. Enunciados CJF. Conselho da Justiça Federal.
Jornadas de Direito Processual Civil 298-99 (2019).
181
See John Sorabji, Procedural Proportionality and Flexibility in England and
Brazil, in HERMES ZANETI JR AND MARCO ANTONIO RODRIGUES (EDS.),
COOPERAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL 588, 588 (2019).
179
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failed to respond to an offer to mediate.182 Master O’Hare ordered
the defendant to pay costs on the indemnity basis from the date it
failed to respond to an offer to mediate:
In respect of the defendant’s failure to mediate, I
think the only sanctions available for me to impose
are to award costs on the indemnity basis and to
award interest on those costs from a date earlier than
today, today being the normal date. I am persuaded
that the defendant’s refusal to mediate in this case
was unreasonable […] Case law on this topic is
largely about penalties imposed on parties who are in
other respects the successful party. In Halsey v
Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576
and in other cases, penalties were imposed upon
winners. They do not involve the imposition of
further penalties upon losers.183

VII.

LAWYER REPRESENTATION AND FREE JUSTICE

So far, we have discussed the heavy burden on the Brazilian
Judiciary caused by the broad access to justice provided for in the
Brazilian Constitution and subsequent laws. Because of the increase
in lawsuits and a growing number of law schools, Brazil has one of
the highest numbers of lawyers in the world.184 In regular civil
courts (i.e. not small-claims courts), professional representation by

182

Reid v. Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Tr. [2015] EWHC B21 (U.K.)
(stating that caselaw is generally about penalties imposed upon winners, not
losers).
183
Reid v. Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Tr. [2015] EWHC B21 (U.K.)
184
See INSTITUCIONAL / QUADRO DE ADVOGADOS, OAB NACIONAL,
https://www.oab.org.br/institucionalconselhofederal/quadroadvogados,
(accessed on 01/13/2021); LUÍS ROBERTO BARROSO.SEM DATA VENIA. UM
OLHAR SOBRE O BRASIL E O MUNDO 205 (2020).
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an attorney is mandatory.185 Self-representation in court is not
allowed: no one may bring a lawsuit pro se.186 Rather than a
conscious policy choice, this reality was the result of strong
lobbying by the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados
do Brasil – OAB) during the drafting of the 1988 Constitution.187
The Brazilian Bar Association actively participated in the process of
re-democratization of Brazil in the 1980s,188 but as any professional
association, it, too, has priorities that exclusively support the
corporative interests of the groups that it represents, even if they are
not in the best interest of society. Their participation resulted in an
unprecedented constitutional provision stating that a lawyer was
‘essential to the administration of justice’.189 Although not essential
in numerous developed democracies in the world, in Brazil the
lawyer was made essential by constitutional provision.
Other important aspects are the expenses and court fees. In
Brazil, parties must advance the payment of attorney’s fees, court
fees, and the necessary expenses associated with the production of
evidence, such as advancing the payment of expert witnesses. 190 At
the end of the proceeding, these costs will be reimbursed by the
losing party (fee-shifting).191 But this general rule has important
exceptions. Contrary to the rule in ordinary proceedings, in smallclaims courts the parties do not have to pay any court costs and there

185

C.P.C. 2015, supra note 154, at art. 103; see also Neil Montgomery and
Helena Calderano, Regulation of the legal profession in Brazil: overview,
THOMPSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L. (Apr. 1, 2018),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-637-9911.
186
See id.
187
See Gary M. Reich, The 1988 Constitution a Decade Later: Ugly
Compromises Reconsidered, 40 J. OF INTERAMERICAN STUD. AND WORLD AFF.
5, 5-6 (1998).
188
See LILIA SCHWARCZ AND HELOISA STARLING, BRASIL. UMA BIOGRAFIA
469-70, 476 and 495 (2015) (discussing that the Brazilian Bar Association
(OAB) participated in the official 1978 meetings to prepare the transition from
dictatorship to a democratic government, in the acts against the torture and in the
resumption of habeas corpus during the dictatorship, and in the impeachment of
President Fernando Collor in 1992).
189
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 133. (“The lawyer is
indispensable to the administration of justice.”)
190
C.P.C. 2015, supra note 154, at art. 82-84.
191
Id. at art. 85.
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is no fee-shifting.192 This rule is valid only in the first instance, not
on appeal.193 The same rules apply in class actions: no court fees and
no fee-shifting.194 Additionally, there is full legal aid available for
individuals and companies that need financial support.195
Those considered “in need” under the law qualify to be
represented by Public Defenders.196 The Public Defenders are
chosen in a highly selective public exam and appointed for life.197
The Public Defenders must give legal advice and judicial
representation in all instances of the court system to people “in
need.”198
Slowly, all states have been creating State Public Defenders.199
In the federal sphere, the Federal Government created the Federal
Public Defenders (Defensoria Publica da Uniao).200 Although the
goal of full legal aid has not yet been fulfilled, 201 law reform and
increased investment indicate considerable progress.
In a region without Public Defenders, the role of lawyers for the
poor may be exercised by court-appointed attorneys.202 Even if the
parties are represented by private attorneys of their choice (paid or
not), they may still request legal aid.203 This option means that the

192

Lei Nº 9.099, de 26 de Setembro de 1995, art. 54 (Braz.).
Id. at art. 55.
194 Id.
195
C.P.C. 2015 supra note 154, at art. 185.
196
Supra note 193 at art. 5º (“the State shall provide full and free-of-charge legal
assistance to all who prove insufficiency of funds”) and 134 (“The Public Legal
Defence is a permanent institution, essential to the jurisdictional function of the
State, and is responsible primarily (…) the full and free-of-charge defence, in all
levels, both judicially and extrajudicially, of individual and collective rights of
the needy.”).
197
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], art. 134.
198 Id.
199
A Defensoria Pública, MAPA DA DEFENSORIA PUBLICA NO BRASIL,
https://www.ipea.gov.br/sites/en-GB/mapadefensoria (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
200 Id.
201
Id. (citing to a 2013 study that demonstrated a lack of public defenders in
72% of Brazilian districts, which means that the public defenders are present in
only 754 of the 2,680 districts.
202
C.P.C. 2015 supra note 154, at art. 72 (“If there is no Public Defender in the
area, the judge must invest a lawyer in that function”).
203
Id. at art. 98-102.
193
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court fees will be waived and that they will not be liable for the
attorney’s fee-shifting if they lose.204
This reality demonstrates how the Brazilian Justice system
constantly invests in a system of comprehensive and free legal aid
for people in need, a direction that is directly against the world trend
of austerity. There is the risk of arriving at a completely free
judiciary for litigants. But since there is no free lunch, a judiciary
entirely dispensed by public entities must be entirely financed by
taxes paid by citizens. But, this may not be a sustainable recipe in
the long run, as the European reality has demonstrated.205
It is undeniable that Brazil needs to broaden its judicial
protection to people in need, and the country is far from providing
the comprehensive and free access to justice that it has promised.
However, there must be control and excesses must be avoided, so
that the expenses do not soar out of control and bring about a
reduction in the protection of fundamental rights. An out of control
and unplanned expansion may lead to setbacks in the future, as is
the situation in Europe now.206 Moreover, as we have mentioned
before, the main problem of the backlog in the Brazilian judicial
system results from a deficit in the public service and in consumer
protection, which can be corrected by the Public Administration and
by regulatory agencies, which double the expenditure of
maintaining the judicial structure for the protection of these
rights.207 Therefore, the Brazilian Supreme Court has recently
demanded that a plaintiff bring his or her claim administratively, in
the Social Security administrative agency, before having access to
the Judiciary (RE 631.240/MG).208 This requirement is not a major
obstacle to access to justice, but is necessary to force the Public
Administration to be effective without the Judiciary.

204

Id. (demonstrating the efficient lobby of the public defenders in Congress).
See Xandra Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, Austerity in Civil Procedure and
the Role of Simplified Procedures, 8 ERASMUS L. REV. 139, 145-46 (2015).
206
See HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE 51 (2010) (explaining the “sorry
state of the civil courts” as and effect of “the resources allocated to the courts”).
207
No. 631.240, de 9 de Março de 2014, RECURSO EXTRAORDINARIO MINAS
GERAIS [R.E.M.G.] de 3.9.2014 (Braz.).
208 Id.
205
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VIII THE AVAILABLE SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS: SMALL-CLAIMS
COURTS, MONITORY ACTION, IN LIMINE JUDGMENT, & REDUCED
INVOLVEMENT OF COURTS IN FAMILY LAW AND WILLS
As a result of the Republican Pact mentioned above, several
changes in the Brazilian procedural system towards more efficient
and speedy procedures were introduced. These changes were
repeated in the new Civil Procedure Code enacted in 2015.209
The laws reduced the need for court involvement in family law,
wills, and notary activities, which led to a de-bureaucratization of
several proceedings like insolvency of companies, changes in public
registry, probate, and divorce.210 These proceedings were once of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Judiciary, but since 2007 may be
decided administratively by a Notary Public, as long as the parties
are in agreement and there is no interest of minors involved.211 This
process avoids unnecessarily long and costly judicial proceedings to
resolve consensual matters. Yet, contradictorily, the presence of an
attorney is still mandatory,212 which may increase costs
unnecessarily in simple proceedings.
Yet another relevant factor in the Brazilian legislation is the
creation of small-claims courts, inspired by the American
experience.213 They have jurisdiction to decide cases of less
complexity, giving more freedom to the parties and more procedural
powers to the judge.214
There is a microsystem of three small-claims courts created by
three statutes enacted within 15 years: state small-claims courts (Lei
9.099/1995), federal small-claims courts (Lei 10.259/01), and smallclaims courts for claims against the Administration (Lei

209

See generally, C.P.C. 2015, supra note 154.
See Lei Nº 11.441, de 4 de Janeiro de 2007.
211 Id.
212
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 103, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) (available in English: https://dpsionline.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Brazilian-Code-of-Civil-Procedure.pdf).
213
See OVIDIO BAPTISTA DA SILVA, JUIZADO DE PEQUENAS CAUSAS (1985);
FELIPE BORRING ROCHA, MANUAL DOS JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS ESTADUAIS
3-9 (2012) (discussing the history of the small-claims courts, originally created
in Brazil in 1984 by Law 7.244).
214
See Candido Rangel, Dinamarco, INSTITUIÇÕES DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL
(2003).
210
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12.153/09).215 These three statutes have similarities and differences,
but they complement each other, creating an integrated legal system
of procedural norms that are subsidiary to each other. The Code of
Civil Procedure is used only in the absence of a specific rule in the
microsystem.216
Moreover, there are principles of procedure that are specific to
the small-claims courts: orality, simplicity, informality, procedural
economy and speed, and constant incentive to settle.217 The law
inaugurated a new paradigm in Brazilian procedural law when it
allowed the federal and state government to settle claims.
Despite the subsidiarity and common principles, there is no
uniformity in the three types of small-claims courts as the courts
have different rules.218 One of the many differences between the
three types of small-claims courts in Brazil is subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts (Juizados
Especiais Cíveis) decide civil claims up to forty times the monthly
minimum wage (about $12,600).219 Its jurisdiction is limited to
cases of less complexity, such as summary proceeding cases. The
two Public Claims Small-Claims Courts, both federal and state
(Juizados Especiais Federais and Juizados Especiais da Fazenda
Publica), decide public claim cases up to sixty times the monthly
minimum wage (about $18,900) and are not limited to cases of less
complexity.220
The repetition of the word “claim” in our English translation of
the small-claims court’s names is not inadvertent. One small-claims
court has jurisdiction over “civil claims” (which are claims of a
private nature) and two small-claims courts have jurisdiction over
215

Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
216
Felipe Borring Rocha, MANUAL DOS JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS ESTADUAIS
(2012).
217 Id.
218
See FELIPE CAMILO DALL-ALBA, CURSO DE JUIZADOS ESPECIALS: JUIZADO
ESPECIAL CIVEL, JUIZADO ESPECIAL FEDERAL E JUIZADO ESPECIAL DA FAZENDA
PUBLICA (2011) (offering a comprehensive comparison between all types of
small claims courts in Brazil).
219 Id.
220 Id.
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“public claims” (which are claims of a public nature against the
states and the federal government).221
Another difference between the three types of small-claims
courts in Brazil is whether their jurisdiction is exclusive, i.e. whether
the use of the small-claims court is mandatory. Most scholars say
that the jurisdiction of the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts is
relative (not exclusive), i.e. the plaintiff may choose between
bringing a claim there or in the regular courts.222 If the claim is over
the jurisdictional amount (forty times the monthly minimum wage),
the plaintiff may still bring his or her claim in the Civil Claims
Small-Claims Courts, but in that case, the plaintiff waives the
amount over the jurisdictional limit.223 In the two Public Claims
Small-Claims Courts, both federal and state, the statute is clear: the
jurisdiction is absolute (exclusive).224 Therefore, any claim over the
jurisdictional amount must be brought in the regular courts.
Another difference between the three types of small-claims
courts in Brazil is that each statute lists subject matters that are
excluded.225 For example, neither of these three small-claims courts
have jurisdiction to decide class action cases, regardless of the value
of the claim or the complexity of the subject matter.226
221

Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
222
See FERNANDO DA COSTA TOURINHO NETO & JOEL DIAS FIGUEIRA
JÚNIOR, JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E CRIMINAIS: COMENTÁRIOS À LEI N.
9.099/1995 89 (2017); see also Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.).
223
See FERNANDO DA COSTA TOURINHO NETO & JOEL DIAS
FIGUEIRA JÚNIOR, JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E CRIMINAIS:
COMENTÁRIOS À LEI N.
9.099/1995 89 (2017); see also Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.).
224
See JOEL DIAS FIGUEIRA JÚNIOR AND FERNANDO DA COSTA
TOURINHONETO. JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E CRIMINAIS:
COMENTÁRIOS À LEI N.
9.099/1995 89 (2017); see also Lei No. 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001 (Braz.);
Lei No. 12,153, de 22 de Dezembro de 2009 (Braz.).
225
Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
226
See Enunciado Nº 139 do FONAJEF, AJUFE (The exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the Special Courts System as regards demands on diffuse or
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There are also structural differences between the three types of
small-claims courts. All of them have three main professionals: (i)
judges (usually from the same judicial career of the regular judges
and selected in the same entrance exam); (ii) lay judges (graduated
in law, but not in the judicial career); and (iii) mediators (specifically
trained to hold conciliation sessions between the parties).227
Another difference between the three types of small-claims
courts in Brazil is the need for legal representation. Contrary to the
general rule in civil and criminal litigation228, in small-claims courts
the parties do not need to be represented by lawyers.229 Initially,
lawyers reacted negatively to this rule, so the older statute is more
timid than the newer ones.
In the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts (the older statute), the
parties do not need to be represented by lawyers in claims below
twenty times the monthly minimum wage (approximately $6,300
USD), but a lawyer is essential in claims between twenty and forty
times the monthly minimum wage.230 In the two Public Claims
Small-Claims Courts, both the federal and the state, which are the
most recent statutes, plaintiffs do not need to be represented by
collective rights or interests, including homogeneous individuals, applies both to
individual demands of a multitudinous nature and to collective actions.). M ARIA
DO CARMO HONÓRIO; ERICK LINHARES; GUILHERME RIBEIRO BALDAN (ORGS.).
OS ENUNCIADOS DO FONAGE E SEUS FUNDAMENTOS 79 (2019).
227 Id.
228
Lei Nº 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, Art. 1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 5.7.1994 (Braz.).
229
Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, Art. 9, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.) (“In claims of value up to twenty minimum
wages, the parties will appear in person and may be assisted by a lawyer; in
claims of higher value, legal assistance is mandatory”); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de
Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº
12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
23.12.2009 (Braz.) (The Supreme Court ruled considering constitutional the
self-representation limited to civil matters in small claims courts).
230
Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, Art. 9, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.) (“In claims of value up to twenty minimum
wages, the parties will appear in person and may be assisted by a lawyer; in
claims of higher value, legal assistance is mandatory”); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de
Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº
12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
23.12.2009 (Braz.) (The Supreme Court ruled considering constitutional the
self-representation limited to civil matters in small claims courts).
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lawyers regardless of the size of their claim.231 This statute generates
a situation of inequality because the government, on the defense
side, will always be represented by its own lawyers. Legal
representation is mandatory in appealing all three types of smallclaims courts. Moreover, on appeal, except in case of legal aid, the
parties will have to pay court fees and attorneys’ fees to the
winner.232
In order to protect its market share, the Brazilian Bar
Association (OAB) filed several direct actions before the Supreme
Court challenging the constitutionality of the provisions waiving
attorney representation in small-claims courts. The OAB argued that
the mandatory representation by lawyers in all civil matters was an
essential part of the Brazilian justice system. The argument was
based on an ambiguous language of the Brazilian Constitution,
which says, in part, that “the lawyer is indispensable to the
administration of justice.”233 It is at most debatable that this
language means that attorney representation is essential to every
lawsuit. Most likely, it is merely an aspirational or inspirational
language, repeated with other words when the Constitution refers to
Public Prosecutors234 and Public Defenders235. The Supreme Court,
therefore, has consistently ruled that access to justice, informality,
orality and other principles of the small claims courts justify selfrepresentation.236
231

Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
232
Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
233
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 133 (Braz.) (“The
lawyer is indispensable to the administration of justice, and they are inviolable
by their acts and manifestations in the exercise of the profession, in the limits of
the law.”).
234
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 127 (Braz.) (“The
Office of the Public Prosecutors is a permanent institution, essential to the
jurisdictional function of the State…”).
235
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 134 (Braz.) (“The
Public Defenders is a permanent institution, essential to the jurisdictional
function of the State…”).
236
S.T.F., ADI 1539, Relator: Min. Maurício Corrêa, 24.4.2003, SUPREMO
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.] (Braz.); S.T.F., ADI 3168,
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The protection of urgent matters (including anticipatory
decision) is expressly allowed in both the federal and state Public
Claims Small-Claims Courts (with the possibility of interlocutory
appeal of the decision).237 The law regarding the Civil Claims
Small-Claims Courts does not provide this protection expressly.
Therefore, the protection of urgent matters is only allowed by
interpretation of the Constitution, which provides for a general
power for provisional matters and anticipation of the final decision
(Article 5, XXXV, CF/88).238 Appeal of the final judgment,
however, is allowed in all three small-claims courts to be decided by
a panel of three first instance judges.239 The appeal only has a
devolutive effect (i.e. no suspensive effect), but the judge may stay
the proceeding to avoid irreversible damage.240
One of the most interesting features of the proceedings in smallclaims courts is the possibility of uniformization of the decisions of
the appeal panels through the resolution of repetitive appeals.241
Relator: Joaquim Barbosa, 08.06.2006, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL
JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.] (Braz.).
237
Dall-Alba, supra note 218.
238
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], Art. 5 (XXXV) (Braz.); see
HERMES ZANETI JR., A CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO. O MODELO
CONSTITUCIONAL DA JUSTIÇA BRASILEIRA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE PROCESSO E
CONSTITUIÇÃO 145 (2014); see also, e.g., S.T.F., ADPF 172 MC-REF, Relator:
Min. Marco Aurélio, 06.10.2009, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL
JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.] (Braz.).
239
Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
240
Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
241
This proceeding was inspired by the German model proceeding
(Musterverfahren), although some commentators also compare it with the
English Group Litigation Order (GLO). See Antonio do Passo Cabral, O Novo
Procedimento-Modelo (Musterverfahren) Alemão: Uma Alternativa às Ações
Coletivas, 147 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 123 (2007); see Antonio Adonias A.
Bastos, A Estabilidade das Decisões Judiciais Como Elemento Contributivo
para o Acesso à Justiça e para o Desenvolvimento Econômico, 227 REVISTA DE
PROCESSO 295 (2014); Guilherme Rizzo Amaral, Efetividade, Segurança,
Massificação e a Proposta de um ‘Incidente de Resolução de Demandas
Repetitivas’, 196 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 237 (2011); Antonio do Passo Cabral,
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Curiously, the proceeding for uniformization of appellate decisions
is not uniform in the three small-claims courts: each one has its own
proceeding.
In the Federal and State Public Claims Small-Claims Court, for
example, it is possible to request uniformization of interpretation of
federal law whenever there is a conflict in the appellate panels
relating to substantive law.242 The uniformization may be regional
or national (Law 10.259/2001 Article 14 and Law 12.153/2009,
Articles 18 and 19).243
There is no specific provision of uniformization in the statute
regulating the Civil Claims Small-Claims Court,244 but whenever
there is a conflict of interpretation between the appellate panels, the
parties may take the case to the Brazilian Supreme Court (Superior
Tribunal de Justica – STJ).245 A bill was proposed to provide a
National Uniformization Panel to provide a proceeding similar to
the Public Claims Small-Claims Courts (Bill 5.741/2013).246 There
was a strong reaction to this project, however, especially from an
institution that represents the small-claims courts (FONAJE): with
a backlog of millions of cases, this Bill will only bring delays

A Escolha da Causa-Piloto nos Incidentes de Resolução de Processos
Repetitivos, 231 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 201 (2014); Dierle Nunes, Novo
Enfoque para as Tutelas Diferenciadas no Brasil? Diferenciação Procedimental
a Partir da Diversidade de Litigiosidades, 180 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 109
(2010).
242
Lei Nº 10.259, Art. 14, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153, Art. 18-19, de 22 de Dezembro de
2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.).
243
Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 13.7.2001 (Braz.).
244
See Rocha, supra note 216, at 260-61.
245
The appellate system of small claims courts is unnecessarily complex. STJ,
AgRg nos EDEcl no PUI n. 694/SP, Rel. Min. Reynaldo Soares da Fonseca,
Terceira Seção, v.u., DJE 2.4.2018. Now the issue is left to state courts to apply
the caselaw from STJ. Some state courts have created panels of uniformization
exclusively to decide cases against the caselaw from STJ. See, e.g., Turma de
Uniformização de Interpretação de Lei,
http://www.tjes.jus.br/institucional/coordenadorias/institucionalcoordenadoriasj
uizados-especiais-civeis-e-criminais/decisoes-da-turma-de-uniformizacao/.
246
See Projeto De Lei 5741/2013, Camara dos Deputados,
https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=58
0322 (last visited Mar. 24, 2021).
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without any significant improvement.247 The Bill was withdrawn in
2015. The main arguments against the bill were: (i) in practice, only
major corporations will be able to finance the uniformization
proceeding; (ii) the uniformization panels will stop the natural
maturation of the subject debated in the several first and second
instance courts; and (iii) the uniformization panels would be the
sixth degree of jurisdiction, increasing the time and effort to decide
conflicts and violating the main principles of economy and
efficiency in small-claims courts.248 Although the bill was not
enacted, the CPC/15 provided that the Small Claims Courts are
bound by second instance decisions from the “incident for the
resolution of repetitive cases” (IRDR) (CPC/2015, art. 985).249
Additionally, the new procedural system has provided for binding
precedents.250
Another important development is the so-called “monitory
action.”251 The Brazilian monitory action is available to pursue any
kind of obligations: pay money, deliver things, to do or refrain from
doing a certain act.252 The creditor only needs written evidence of
his or her right to obtain a subpoena.253 The debtor must pay, deliver,
247

See Mais de 100 projetos querem mudar funcionamento de juizados
especiais, ConJur January 27, 2015 (quoting Ricardo Chimenti), available at
https://www.conjur.com.br/2015-jan-27/100-projetos-mudar-competenciajuizados-especiais.
248 Id.
249
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 985, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
250
See HERMES ZANETI JR., O VALOR VINCULANTE DOS PRECEDENTES. TEORIA
DOS PRECEDENTES NORMATIVOS FORMALMENTE VINCULANTES (forthcoming
2021).
251
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 700, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) (“An action for the execution of an unenforceable
instrument may be filed by whoever alleges, on the basis of written
unenforceable evidence, that he or she has a right to claim, from a competent
debtor: I – the payment of a sum of money; II – the delivery of a fungible or
non-fungible thing or of movable or immovable property; III – the performance
of an obligation to do or not to do.”).
252
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 700, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
253
See CANDIDO RANGEL DINAMARCO, A REFORMA DO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO
CIVIL 230 (1995); see JOSE ROGERIO CRUZ E TUCCI, AÇÃO MONITÓRIA (1997)
(discussing the monitory action in Brazil); EDUARDO TALAMINI , TUTELA
MONITÓRIA: A AÇÃO MONITÓRIA (2001); LUIZ GUILHERME MARINONI &
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do, or refrain from doing within 15 days.254 If the debtor does not
present a defense, the creditor obtains an “executive judicial title”
and may enforce it in court (CPC/2015, Articles 700, 701 and
702).255
The monitory proceeding is not mandatory: the creditor may
choose the traditional civil proceeding,256 but the monitory
proceeding offers advantages for the creditor (who may have his or
her claim satisfied quickly) and for the debtor (who may have costs
and attorney’s fees waived if the request is complied with).
Despite the similarities, the structure and scope of the Brazilian
monitory proceedings are different from the “European order for
payment procedure” (Regulation 1896/2006), an injunctive
proceeding for payment that is more effective than its Brazilian
counterpart to obtain the practical result in a reasonable amount of
time and the de-bureaucratization of the justice system.257 The
DANIEL MITIDIERO, CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL: COMENTADO ARTIGO POR
ARTIGO (2008);Hermes Zaneti, JR., and Rodrigo Mazzei, Ação Monitória:
Primeiras Impressões Após a Lei n. 11.232/05, in PAULO HOFFMAN AND
LEONARDO FERRES DA SILVA RIBEIRO (EDS.), PROCESSO DE EXECUÇÃO CIVIL:
MODIFICAÇÕES DA LEI 11.232/05 249-74 (2006); Hermes Zaneti, JR., and
Rodrigo Mazzei, Ação Monitória: Primeiras Impressões Após a Lei n.
11.232/05, in PAULO HOFFMAN AND LEONARDO FERRES DA SILVA RIBEIRO
(EDS.), PROCESSO DE EXECUÇÃO CIVIL: MODIFICAÇÕES DA LEI 11.232/05 249-74
(2006). The monitory action generated a rich practical and theoretical debate,
resulting in the enactment of several ‘Judicial Statements’ (Súmulas n. 233, 282,
299, 339) from the Brazilian Supreme Court (Superior Tribunal de Justica). See
HEITOR SICA, 10 COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL 142-53 (2018)
(discussing arts. 674 to 718 of the CPC/15).
254
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 701, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.)
255
Id. at Art. 700-02.
256
Id. at Art. 700.
257
See generally, European Order for Payment Procedure, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(COM 1896) (2006).
(“The regulation, which has applied since 2008, establishes a European
procedure for orders for payment. The procedure simplifies, speeds up, and
reduces the costs of litigation in cross-border cases concerning uncontested
pecuniary claims. The regulation permits the free circulation of European orders
for payment throughout European Union (EU) countries by laying down
minimum standards, compliance with which renders unnecessary any
intermediate proceedings in the EU country of enforcement prior to recognition
and enforcement. (...) The European order for payment procedure applies to civil
and commercial matters in cross-border cases, whatever the nature of the court
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European order for payment has been applicable since 2008 in civil
and commercial matters, independently of the type of court.258 The
country needs profound law reforms that change the structure of
legal proceedings, even with unwanted collateral effects. Although
we need to preserve the procedural guarantees, they must be adapted
to the current needs of society. This shift is underway.
Finally, there is the in limine judgment against the plaintiff
whenever the issue to be decided is a legal matter and the court has
previously decided a similar issue in a binding precedent.259 In such
cases, the defendants do not need to be served with process for the
court to decide the case on the merits against the plaintiff.260 If the
plaintiff appeals, the judge will have five days to reconsider his or
her decision.261 Only then will the defendant be served with process
to present an answer to the appeal (CPC/2015, Article 332).262
“AGE OF AUSTERITY” IN BRAZILIAN CIVIL JUSTICE? A
NEEDED BALANCE
Brazil has always had experience with living under the austerity
necessity because it has always been a country without adequate
resources and deeply ingrained social inequality. But the current
“Era of Austerity” or “financial crisis” (austerity-control) has finally
reached Brazil. The Brazilian economy slowed down between 2014
IX.

or tribunal. A cross-border case is one in which at least one of the parties is
domiciled or habitually resident in an EU country other than the country of the
court hearing the action. The regulation applies to all EU countries except
Denmark.”)
258 Id.
259
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 332, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) (“In cases that waive the evidentiary stage, the
judge, regardless of the service of summons upon the defendant, shall deny, on a
preliminary basis, any claim that contradicts: I – a precedent established by the
Federal Supreme Court or by the Superior Court of Justice (…) § 2 If an appeal
proper is not filed, the defendant shall be notified of the res judicata judgment,
under art. 241.”).
260
Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 332, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
261 Id.
262 Id.
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and early 2020,263 and the decrease affected the behavior of the
government through the Judiciary and incumbent expenses. As we
have demonstrated, after decades concerned exclusively with
efficiency and legal certainty, Brazil woke up for fiscal adjustment
and the balance of the accounts of the Judiciary.
Court fees have recently risen, several bills try to address the
free justice system, and a broad Employment Law Reform show
concern for austerity measures.264 The unfortunate consequence is
that it all means fewer rights and less access to justice, which may
affect constitutional guarantees.
As a general criticism, it is clear that several deficiencies in
Brazil overburden the Judiciary and generate a structural
inefficiency of the system. For example, the ideal of ‘free justice,’
the fact that certain proceedings designed to facilitate the
administration of justice are not mandatory (such as some kinds of
small-claims courts), as well as the historic need to provide the
population with basic fundamental rights (such as health, education,
environment, honest administration, and respect of consumers).
The country adopted an extremely loose vision of the access to
justice as an individual right that is absolute and nonwaivable (droit
indisponible). The Judiciary was not seen merely as a regular public
service, Therefore, legislative solutions ended up worsening the
problem, and creating what we can identify as an Era of Indulgence.
In the Era of Indulgence, money is wasted and access to justice is
not obtained because of the judiciary backlog generated by the broad
access to justice. Moreover, the backlog overburdens the public
coffers with unnecessary expenses. The government is using the
Justice in Numbers report to address these issues.265

263

Brazil Overview, WORLD BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview (last updated Oct. 14,
2019).
264
See https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/07/05/austeridadeeconomica-prejudica-politicas-sociais-afirmam-debatedores (meeting held at
Senate, criticizing the social impacts of the austerity policies).
265
See CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTICA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/pesquisasjudiciarias/justica-em-numeros/ (arguing that the Justice in Number Report is
the most important source of oficial statistics since 2004 and it is used as
indicators and tool of analysis to the management of the Judicial branch) (last
visited Apr. 12, 2021).
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Only recently did the legislature start to reduce the unrestricted
access to justice through filters on appeals, mandatory simplified
proceedings, aggregation of repetitive cases (test cases), binding
precedents, etc. This restriction was done, however, not to obtain the
economy, but to obtain efficiency and legal certainty. It is hoped,
however, that these law reforms will also represent a reduction in
the costs of the public machinery.
Despite the enormous effort in recent years to obtain empirical
data and judicial statistics, the research conducted is insufficient to
make a complete and accurate evaluation of the performance of the
Judiciary. Future research will certainly allow a more precise
evaluation of its performance and will allow verification of whether
the current law reforms have been successful.
For the time being, in Brazil, we spend more money without
obtaining a proportional increase in the efficiency and effectiveness
of the judicial system—this reality is the general picture of the
Brazilian Justice System so far. We believe that, with the new-found
focus in the management of the Judiciary, this reality may begin to
change. One may see a slow decrease in costs and litigiousness. We
hope, however, that this goal may be obtained without a reduction
in the quality of service of justice, the protection of human rights,
and the access to justice, particularly of those in need.

